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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND HATE SPEECH
Onder Bakircioglu*
"Sir, I do not share your views, but I would risk my life for your right to express them."
-Voltaire
I. INTRODUCTION
Not very long ago, it was believed that the sun rotated around the earth, that
unicorns existed, toads were poisonous, and that there could be no men living in
the antipodes as it was believed they would fall off. Not until the 16th Century
was the efficacy of witchcraft questioned, and those who dared to question this
superstition were burned at the stake. 2 Similarly, the legitimacy of servitude was
not questioned for many centuries. All these absolute doctrines are discarded
and new truths have replaced the old ones. No doubt, some of today's truths will
share the same fate one day.
Moreover, some scholars who are now universally acknowledged to be
remarkably virtuous were condemned or dishonoured in their own time.
Socrates, for instance, was condemned to drink the hemlock because of his
unorthodox views. Giordano Bruno was burnt alive by the Inquisition. Servetus
Michael was branded as a heretic and executed by Calvinists.3  In short,
throughout history, those who held untraditional views were despised and
silenced. This, to a certain extent, holds true even today, although the methods of
* Onder Bakircioglu, lecturer in law, Queen's University Belfast. I would like to express my
gratitude to Professor Kevin Boyle, Professor Caroline Fennell, Olufemi Amao and Joanna
Heffernan for their constructive criticism and suggestions.
1. Francious Marie Arouet, Voltaire, 1694-1778 (quotation attributed to Voltaire although not
found in any of his writings).
2. BERTRAND RUSSELL, UNDERSTANDING HISTORY: AND OTHER ESSAYS 61-62 (Philosophical
Library 1957).
3. ld at 66; see Ben Clarke, Freedom of Speech and Criticism of Religion: What are the
Limits, 14 MURDOCH U. ELEC. L.J. 94, 95-98 (2007).
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suppression are somewhat milder and restrictions are justified on different
grounds.
Today, there is a common understanding that free speech constitutes the
basic pillar of progress for democratic societies. The scope of this right is an
important yardstick against which the sophistication and confidence of a given
democracy can be measured. This is not the case in authoritarian regimes, which
are characterized by the suppression of their political opponents by all necessary
means. It is thus arguable that democracy is built on a paradox: by protecting
freedom of expression and its requirements it gives its opponents the possibility
to undermine its very existence.
4
II. THE NEED TO STRIKE A BALANCE
Free speech is not merely of fundamental importance for democratic
societies, but it is one of the most basic rights of an individual that enables him
to form and develop his opinions, and thereby to realize himself.5 Freedom of
expression, however, is not absolute, but may be subject to certain limitations.6
Most democratic states impose restrictions on certain forms of expression,
depending on the political and historical context. Germans, for instance, are
naturally more sensitive about Nazi propaganda than other nations. The British,
on the other hand, are keener to restrict racially motivated speech due to its
colonial past and its concern to keep its diverse population in harmony. 7 In that
regard, as Boyle notes, "a society that respects freedom of expression is not one
where there are no restrictions on that freedom. There are always
restrictions.... [A] healthy society is to be measured ... by noting whether
there is open public debate and argument about the necessity of restriction in
particular cases."' 8 Indeed, a society that does not fight against the seeds of its
own destruction cannot be deemed healthy. Yet, the main question is how to
balance the competing interests, or rather how to restrict speech that incites
4. Paul Mahoney & Lawrence Early, Freedom of Expression and National Security: Judicial
and Policy Approaches Under the European Convention on Human Rights and Other Council of
Europe Instruments, in SECRECY AND LIBERTY: NATIONAL SECURITY, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND
ACCESS TO INFORMATION 109, 109 (Sandra Coliver et al. eds., Martinus Nijoff Pub. 1999).
5. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 737, 49 (1976).
6. Mordechai Kremnitzer & Khaled Ghanayim, Incitement, Not Sedition, in FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY 147, 48 (David Kretzmer and Francine Kershman
Hazan eds., Kluwer L. Int'l. 2000).
7. See Conor Gearty, Rethinking Civil Liberties in a Counter-Terrorism World, EUR. HUM.
RTS. L. REv. 111, 113 (2007).
8. Kevin Boyle, Freedom of Expression and Restriction on Freedom of Expression (2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Tulsa Journal of Comparative & International Law)
[hereinafter Boyle, Freedom].
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hatred, violence or discrimination without harming the core of the right to
freedom of expression.
A. Democracy, Freedoms and Limitations
Democracy is a struggle both for free speech and for the right to equality.
Free speech therefore should not to be sacrificed for the protection of the status
quo; yet destructive speech is also to be balanced against the requirements of the
right to equality and non-discrimination, for as too many examples demonstrate,
"hate speech can kill." 9 Catharine MacKinnon asserts:
Saying 'kill' to a trained attack dog is only words. Yet it is not seen as
expressing the viewpoint 'I want you dead'-which it usually does, in fact,
express. It is seen as performing an act tantamount to someone's destruction,
like saying 'ready, aim, fire' to a firing squad. 
10
Therefore, it is obvious that not all forms of speech can be protected; otherwise
the basic tenets of criminal law would have to be discarded. Free speech,
however, should be protected against arbitrary restrictions under the pretext of
national security or the rights and reputation of others, etc. As many examples
demonstrate, these elusive concepts might well be resorted to in order to silence
dissidents against a political regime. Nevertheless, the presence and promotion
of political and social equality and freedom from racial, social or sexual
discrimination are also essential for properly functioning democracies, where
these overlapping but sometimes conflicting values are to be balanced.
This paper attempts to illustrate the boundaries of freedom of speech in
connection with the protection of other values. The burning question is how free
speech can be discerned from hate speech. In other words, is there a reliable
yardstick against which the concrete boundaries of the right to freedom of speech
can be measured? In order to answer these questions this study examines the
regulation of free speech under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and in light of the international standards, namely under the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention). The purpose of this study is to illustrate how
elusive the endeavour of striking a balance between the right to freedom of
expression and other vital interests could be, and that legal approach alone falls
short of addressing the root causes of the problems encountered in free speech
discourse.
9. Kevin Boyle, Hate Speech-The United States Versus the Rest of the World, 53 ME. L. REv.
488, 501-02 (2001) [hereinafter Boyle, Hate Speech].
10. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, ONLY WORDS 12 (Harv. U. Press, 1993) (emphasis in original).
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B. What is Hate Speech?
Hate speech is an elusive concept, which is not easy to define. It covers
abusive, denigrating, harassing speech targeting a group's or individual's
national, racial, religious or ethnic identity. Yet there is no universally
acknowledged definition. "Human Rights Watch defines hate speech as 'any
form of expression regarded as offensive to racial, ethnic and religious groups
and other discrete minorities, and to women." 12 Some scholars define it as a
"generic term that has come to embrace the use of speech attacks based on race,
ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation or preference."'
3
The lack of an agreed definition causes difficulty in determining when
exactly an expression constitutes hate speech. Indeed, some speech might be so
offensive that it may foster a climate of prejudice or discrimination against
minority groups; yet it might not constitute hate speech. Similarly, the media
may include disparaging news about minorities or religious groups, 14 or may
portray members of religious or ethic minority groups through cliched and
stereotyped images, which might be offensive, but not hate speech. 15 In this
regard, a wide definition of hate speech would include group libel, or an attack
on the dignity or reputation of a given group or individual. This would cover
speech that is considered offensive regardless of whether it would lead to
harmful results. A narrower definition of hate speech, however, would limit
speech "that is intended to incite hatred or violence" against certain groups or
individuals. 6 The difficulty of having no universally acknowledged criteria for
the determination of hate speech might be remedied by the further development
of case law at the national and international level.
C. The Damage Done by Hate Speech
Hate speech, the "words that are used as weapons to ambush, terrorize,
wound, humiliate, and degrade," damages "not only the targeted group or
11. HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW
POLITICS MORALS 749 (Oxford U. Press, 2d ed. 2000).
12. SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY 8 (U. of
Neb. Press, 1995) (1994).
13. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 152 (Vintage 1993).
14. See Debbi Schlussel, Suspected VA Tech shooter might be a 'Paki' Part of 'Terrorist
Attack', MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA, Apr. 17, 2007,
http://mediamatters.org/items/200704170006.
15. See Clarke, supra note 3, at 104 n. 38 (the incidents following the publication of cartoons of
Muhammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten showed how elusive the demarcation
between freedom of speech/press and hate speech could be); see also Robert Post, Religion and
Freedom of Speech: Portraits of Muhammad, 14 CONSTELLATIONS 72 (2007); Eric Heinze,
Viewpoint Absolutism and Hate Speech, 69 MOD. L. REv. 543 (2006).
16. Boyle, Freedom, supra note 8, at 6-7.
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individual's physiological and emotional state, but also personal freedom,
dignity, and personhood" and society at large. 17 On an individual scale, it is
established that, "[t]he immediate, short-term harms of hate speech include rapid
breathing, headaches, raised blood pressure, dizziness, rapid pulse rate, drug-
taking, risk-taking behavior, and even suicide."'18 In fact, some scientists suspect
that the high blood pressure of many African Americans may possibly be linked
to repressed or suppressed anger in addition to genetic factors. 19  The
psychological harm of hate speech also includes fear, nightmares, and
withdrawal of the targeted individual or group from society. Scientists, who
have studied the effects of racial slurs or hate speech, believe that such speech
affects children and youthful targets more than adults. In this respect, Richard
Delgado notes that, "[c]hildren as young as three develop consciousness of race;
they know, furthermore, that race makes a difference, and that it is better to be of
some races than others."
20
Hate speech also affects society as a whole. Indeed, not only do individuals
exposed to hate speech suffer a loss of dignity, self-esteem and sense of
belonging to the community, but the targeted group also suffers estrangement
from society, a loss of cultural identity, and group reputacion. Thus, society, in a
general sense, becomes fragile because intolerance and divisiveness hinder the
equal and healthy participation of everyone in the democratic process. 2 1 "Worst
of all," notes Nicholas Wolfson, "such speech degrades the objects of abuse,
silences them through fear, does them psychological damage, and creates a
• ... ,,22
smarmy and nauseating culture that harms women and minorities.
Such speech thus fosters inequality by playing a major role in the
construction of social reality from the demonization of minority groups or
immigrants, objectification of women, denigration of homosexuals to genocide.23
Indeed, the role of hate speech in the Holocaust is a fresh memory. Recent
events have shown how the flow of information was manipulated by mass media
and controlled by the ruling party to increase ethnic antagonisms in the former
17. Gloria Cowan et al., Hate Speech and Constitutional Protection: Priming Values of
Equality and Freedom, 58 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 247, 248 (2002).
18. RICHARD DELGADO AND JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND 13
(Westview Press 2004).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 14. The detrimental affects of hate speech are not limited to physical and
psychological harm, but also extend to the economic prospects of the victim's life. Studies show
that victims of hate speech or racial slurs tend to be timid, bitter, tense, or defensive and they
perform poorly in employment, and other environments at large. Id. at 11-17.
21. See N. Kathleen Sam Banks, Could Mom be Wrong? The Hurt of Names and Words: Hate
Propaganda and Freedom of Expression, 6 MURDOCH U. ELEC. L. J. 124, 26 (1999).
22. NICHOLAS WOLFSON, HATE SPEECH, SEX SPEECH, FREE SPEECH 2 (Praeger Pub. 1997).
23. MACKINNON, supra note 10, at 30-31.
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Yugoslavia. 24  Similarly, U.N. reports proved the deadly influence of a radio
station, Radis Mille Collines, in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. 25  The then
U.N. special rapporteur vividly illustrated how radio transmissions played a
central role in inciting ethnic hatred and mass murder: "the generally illiterate
Rwandese rural population listens very attentively to broadcasts in Kinyarwanda;
they hold their radio sets in one hand and their machetes in the other, ready to go
into action."
26
D. The Escalation of Racism
Until the 1920s, it was widely and reasonably accepted that racial
prejudices were inherited. Similarly, white supremacy as an ideology had been
employed to justify the political and economic domination by the Western World
over the "others."27 This ideology was also employed in connection with anti-
black racism, anti-Semitism, or to justify discrimination against Native
Americans, Chinese, Irish, Southeast Asians, and Arabs, among others.
28
Until recent times the advocacy of white supremacy, expressions of
prejudice and hatred against Jews and blacks, namely what today is called hate
speech, was mainstream speech. This phenomenon was central to European
culture and there were no hate groups advocating racism or white superiority as
24. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Criminalizing Hate Speech in the Crucible of Trial: Prosecutor v.
Nahimana, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 557, 579 (2006).
25. Yet, well before the genocide, the U.N. officials and NGOs pinpointed the central role of
the radio transmissions in provoking the ethno-political violence. When the genocide began,
international media also identified the sinister role of radio broadcasts, which led to calls for the
United States and other powerful states to jam the broadcast, but to no avail. The international
community has failed to prevent the Rwanda genocide due to political considerations and lack of
will; it is now failing with the ongoing massacres in Darfur. See Jamie Frederic Metzl, Rwandan
Genocide and the International Law of Radio Jamming, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 628, 628-29 (1997);
Alexander C. Dale, Countering Hate Messages that Lead to Violence: The United Nations'
Chapter VII Authority to Use Radio Jamming to Halt Incendiary Broadcasts, II DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 109 (2001). For a detailed analysis of the Rwandan Genocide, see Stephen R. Shalom,
The Rwanda Genocide: The Nightmare that Happened, Z MAGAZINE, Apr. 1996, at 25; Marko
Milanovic, State Responsibility for Genocide, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 553, 604 (2006).
26. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, 59, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7 (June 28, 1994) (prepared
by R. Degni-S~gui). See generally Henri Zukier, The Essential "Other" and the Jew: From
Antisemitism to Genocide, 63 Soc. RES. 1110, 1118 (1996).
27. The mission of civilizing the "other" has a long historical lineage, which was frequently
employed to subjugate other nations for imperialistic purposes. See, e.g., Francisci De Victoria, De
Indis Et De Ivre Belli Reflectiones, in REFLECTIONES THEOLOGICAE XII 150, 155-56 (Ernest Nys
ed., John Pawley Bate trans., Oceana Publications, 1964) (1917).
28. See James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Hate Crimes: A Critical Perspective, 22 CRIME
& JUST. 1, 4-5, 21-24 (1997); Josh Adams, & Vincent J. Roscigno, White Supremacists,
Oppositional Culture and the World Wide Web, 84 Soc. FORCES 759, 770-75 (2005).
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it was the official ideology itself.29 In this respect, the Holocaust was, in a sense,
the culmination of the appalling prejudice against Jews, which later gave birth to
the initiatives at the international level to create the United Nations and today's
human rights discourse.
Today, hate-mongers seek ways to protest the abandonment of these age-
old prejudices against Jews, blacks, minority groups, Muslims, 30 or other
members of society.3 1 As Kevin Boyle notes:
Hate speech in that sense is political speech; it seeks to restore theories and
ideas that were defeated by democratic struggle ... and their hatred is directed
at the beneficiaries of those struggles ... Hate speech is also about power and
economic competition...
It is a struggle of ideas, the ideas of restoring white supremacy-the exclusion
of Jews and other hated minorities-versus the idea of equal human dignity
for all.
32
Thus, an effective war against hate speech cannot achieve victory without
focusing on the root causes of discrimination, which, among other things,
includes socioeconomic and political injustice, lack of strong civil societies and
firmly rooted democracies, the existence of which can foster peace and tolerance
in a community.
29. Boyle, Freedom, supra note 8, at 2.
30. The "war on terror" and its accompanying rhetoric have not only served to justify
encroachments on civil liberties, they also gave rise to the increase in the usage of sweeping and
disparaging language against the Muslim community. For instance Section 412 of the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001, known as the "Patriot Act," provides for the "mandatory detention of
suspected terrorists." USA PATRIOT Act, § 412, 8 U.S.C. § 1226a. This section empowers the
Attorney General to detain any alien whom he certifies as a terrorist. The detainee may be kept in
custody indefinitely, as long as the Attorney General determines, in his sole discretion, that the
release of the alien would threaten national security or the safety of general public or any
individual. The Patriot Act resembles the Emergency Detention Act of 1950, which was enacted
during the McCarthy era in reaction to the Communist hysteria. See Jennifer Van Bergen &
Douglas Valentine, The Dangerous World of Indefinite Detentions: Vietnam to Abu Ghraib, 37
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 449, 451-52 (2005-06); Jens Meierhenrich, Analogies at War, 11 J.
CONFLICT & SEC. L. 1, 28-29 (2006).
31. For a comprehensive analysis of the rise of racism in Europe following the collapse of
socialist regimes see Paul Gordon, Racist Violence: The Expression of Hate in Europe, in STRIKING
A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 9, 9-17 (Sandra
Coliver et al. eds., 1992).
32. Boyle, Hate Speech, supra note 9, at 493.
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III. SHOULD WE RESTRICT HATE SPEECH?
The right to freedom of expression is not only of vital importance for
democratic societies, but it is also crucial for the enjoyment of many other
rights33 and freedoms. 34 The importance of this right was colourfully illustrated
by Amartya Sen:
[N]o substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent country with a
democratic form of government and a relatively free press. Famines have
occurred in ancient kingdoms and contemporary authoritarian societies, in
primitive tribal communities and in modern technocratic dictatorships, in
colonial economies run by imperialists from the north and in newly
independent countries of the south run by despotic national leaders or by
intolerant single parties. But they have never materialized in any country that
is independent, that goes to elections regularly, that has opposition parties to
voice criticisms and that permits newspapers to report freely and question the
wisdom of government policies without extensive censorship.
35
Those who oppose hate speech thus do not deny the importance of free
speech, yet they are well aware of the potential dangers that might emerge out of
its unleashed and irresponsible practice.36 In the face of serious and continuing
ethnic, religious, and sexual discrimination and its violent consequences, any
viable solution to eliminate hate speech must take into account the delicate
balance between free speech and other competing values in each individual case.
Therefore, on the one hand, there is no denial that freedom of expression is
essential to defeat discrimination, bigotry and intolerance; 37 on the other, free
speech cannot always be preferred over other equally important values, such as
non-discrimination and equality.
The problem lies in the necessity of constant struggle, in every individual
case, to determine which value(s) is to be preferred over the other(s). There is a
consensus over the need to eliminate racism, bigotry, and discrimination in all its
forms that trigger hate speech and hate crimes. As noted earlier, the main
controversy lies in how to achieve this goal. In a speech, delivered by
33. In a General Assembly resolution it. was stated that "[flreedom of information is a
fundamental human right and is the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is
consecrated.... G.A. Res. 59 (1), T 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/I (Dec. 14, 1946).
34. DONNA GOMIEN, SHORT GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 78 (2d
ed., Council of Europe 1998).
35. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 152-53 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc 1999).
36. Kevin Boyle, Overview of a Dilemma: Censorship Versus Racism, in STRIKING A BALANCE:
HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION I (Sandra Coliver et al. eds.,
1992) [hereinafter Boyle, Dilemma].
37. See id.
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Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsein Loong, the rejection of the publication of
the Danish cartoons and Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses was rationalized
as follows: "[p]eople say, 'where is freedom of expression?', we say maintaining
harmony, peace, that's the first requirement.... This episode will deepen the
gulf between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe. But in Singapore, we have
to maintain our social harmony and religious harmony at all costs." 38 The
delicate question here is whether or not peace and harmony can be established
without suffocating the voice of dissidents and minority groups. In order to
answer this question it is now necessary to briefly assess the arguments
presented on behalf of free speech in a critical fashion.
A. Free Speech Versus Hate Speech
The first argument put forward on behalf of unlimited free speech is based
on the assumption that free speech contributes to the self-fulfilment of the
individual. This premise mainly derives from Western thought according to
which the proper end of man is the realization and fulfilment of his potential as a
human being. Thought and exchange of opinions in a free manner is sine qua
non for achieving this goal.
39
There is no doubt that government interference in the exercise of free
speech would inevitably affect individual autonomy and liberty, which might
constitute a grave hindrance to individual development. This view, however,
omits to evaluate the damaging impacts of hate speech on its victims. Hate
speech can easily silence and demoralize its victims, discouraging them from
participating in many activities of civil society, including public debate, which
prevents them from realizing themselves. 4 In this context, Owen Fiss notes that,
"[e]ven when [those] victims speak, their words lack authority; it is as though
they said nothing.... [Hate speech also] impairs their credibility and makes
them feel as though they have nothing to contribute to public discussion."4 1 The
argument of individual self-fulfilment thus should also take the victims of hate
speech and their personal development and self-realization into account. It can
well be argued that the individual self-fulfilment argument might also justify
legitimate restrictions of hate speech to protect the safety, honour or reputation
of the potential targets of hate speech; since self realization cannot be separated
from the concepts of safety, equality, non-discrimination or self-esteem.
38. Kent Roach, National Security, Multiculturalism and Muslim Minorities, 12 SING. J. LEGAL
STUD. 405, 433-34 (2006).
39. See FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 205 (Nat'l Textbook Co. 1979); Larry
Alexander, Freedom of Speech, in FREEDOM OF SPEECH VOLUME I: FOUNDATIONS 5 (Larry
Alexander ed., Ashgate 2000).
40. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 18, at 154.
41. OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 16 (Harv. U. Press 1998).
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The second justification is based on the notion of attainment of truth, i.e.,
suppression of information or free discussion not only prevents one from
reaching better conclusions, but blocks the whole society, and perpetuates error.
The collective nature of free speech is linked with the interchange of ideas and
information among individuals to construct better ideas or establish the truth.
42
The rationale for this argument is best expressed by John Stuart Mill:
He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons
may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is
equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side ... he has no ground
for preferring either opinion.
Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly
does, contain a portion of truth... it is only by the collision of adverse
opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.
Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth;
unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested,
it will ... be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or
feeling of its rational grounds.
4 3
This hypothesis, however, would have been much stronger had it taken into
consideration that in a society not everybody has equal access to speech and is
able to voice their concerns. In fact, hate speech targets the most vulnerable
sections of society, namely ethnic or religious minorities, immigrants or women,
who have limited access to speech channels. As Kent Greenawalt argues:
Acquiring confidence that truth will advance in a regime of freedom would be
simple if people rather quickly understood the truth when it was presented to
them and if competing ideas had an equal claim on people's attention. Two
claims undermine such confidence: the gross inequality among
communicators in the marketplace of ideas and the inclination of people to
believe messages that are already dominant socially or that serve unconscious,
irrational needs.
44
Admittedly, in a democratic society, where theoretically people have the
chance to challenge ideas on equal footing, the existence of governmental control
would be fruitless, or rather dangerous and might lead to mind-control of
individuals. Nevertheless, in an unequal society in which the balance of power
42. NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: NATIONAL,
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 666 (Cambridge U. Press 2002).
43. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 53, 76 (George Routledge & Sons, Ltd 1915) (1885).
44. Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 119, 134 (1989).
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determines the flow of information, the state machine, without being unduly
intrusive, might regulate the flow of information, and create communication
channels for the vulnerable, thus creating equal opportunities to eliminate the
domination of the powerful in the marketplace of ideas.
It is arguable that once the state starts regulating or restricting speech, this
would "eventuate in restricting more or all speech: [which is known as] the
'slippery slope' hazard." 45 Defenders of this argument claim that restricting
speech might be tempting for totalitarian states: "if we restrict this bad thing
now, we will not be able to stop ourselves from restricting this good thing
later."4 6 However, restriction of speech is not the only thing that a totalitarian or
undemocratic state can do; such a state can blur the marketplace of ideas with
valueless, false ideas (where it would be impossible to discern bad ideas from the
good), foster inequality by other means, create obstacles for certain segments of
society to participate in the democratic process or access to education, etc.
47
James Jacobs, quoting Professor Abraham S. Goldstein states, "[t]hose who see
efforts to regulate group libel as taking us down a 'slippery slope' to censorship
pay too little attention to a second 'slippery slope'--one which can produce a
swift slide into a 'marketplace of ideas' in which bad ideas flourish and good
ones die."
'48
The third argument is related to the concept of participation in the
democratic decision-making process. Once the assumption that governments
derive their power and legitimacy from the consent of the governed is accepted,
the necessity of free speech can reasonably be deduced. Indeed, the participation
of informed citizenry in the democratic process requires the existence of free
speech and vigorous discussion.4 9 Admittedly, free speech is of vital importance
particularly for the minorities, blacks, homosexuals and women; in short, for
those who are potential targets of discrimination and hate speech. By democratic
process these segments of society would find ways to affect public policy and
voice their concerns and thereby, to a certain extent, find ways to remedy the
silencing, destructive effects of discrimination and hate speech. Free speech,
however, is not the sole condition for effective democratic participation; indeed
other elements, such as fair distribution of income, equal access to education,
free media, effective social policies, free elections, multiparty democracy, fair
representation of minority groups, that is, the requirements of a pluralist
45. MACKINNON, supra note 10, at 76.
46. Id.
47. But see WOLFSON, supra note 22, at 83-100.
48. JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTrER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY POLITICS
111 (Oxford U. Press 1998) (quoting Professor Abraham S. Goldstein, Yale Law School).
49. Alexander, supra note 39, at 6; see Greenawalt, supra note 44, at 274.
2008]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
democracy should accompany the right to free speech. Otherwise, democratic
participation would only be a theoretical possibility, rather than a reality.
Fourthly, it is asserted that suppression of expression would conceal the real
problems that lie beneath the surface. Suppression of speech, accordingly, not
only diverts public attention from the real causes of a crisis that affects a society
as a whole, but it might also cause social stagnation, which may, in the long run,
result in dissatisfaction with the governing body of a given organization. Open
discussion, therefore, is considered as "a method... of maintaining the
precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus." 50 This
position was defended under the First Amendment by Justice Douglas:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition
of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs
people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at
prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it
presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not
absolute, is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless
shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive
evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. There is
no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the
alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts,51
or dominant political or community groups.
Similarly, Stephen A. Smith convincingly argues that:
[H]ate speech can serve an important social and political function. Irrational
expressions of hate based on the status of the targets can alert us to the fact
that something is wrong-in the body politic, in ourselves, or in the speakers.
It might suggest that some change is necessary, or it might only warn us
against the potential for demagogues.
52
This view, however, overlooks the destructive and sometimes irrevocable
effects of hate speech, which might seriously damage the reutation of the
targeted group, thereby triggering violent attacks against them. The Rwanda
50. HAIMAN, supra note 39, at 205.
51. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4-5 (1949) (citations omitted).
52. Stephan A. Smith, There's Such a Thing as Free Speech: And It's a Good Thing, Too, in
HATE SPEECH, 226, 260 (Rita Kirk Whillock & David Slayden eds. Sage Publications 1995).
53. In Jersild v. Denmark, this point was examined by Judge Golcuklu, Russo, and Valticos. In
their dissenting opinion they emphasized the responsibilities of the media while broadcasting a TV
programme which contained crude racist remarks:
[Freedom of speech] should [not] extend to encouraging racial hatred, contempt
for races other than the one to which we belong, and defending violence against
those who belong to the races in question.... Large numbers of young people
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genocide is a textbook illustration of how hate speech causes heinous results
within a very short period of time. In other words, particularly in times of crisis,
be it economic, social, or political, hate speech can destroy a community.
54
Moreover, the above-mentioned argument assumes a society where well-
informed individuals, in the end, would discern the good from the evil in speech.
Since hate speech was mainstream until recent times, it was only the heavy cost
of historical experience which triggered change. While it may well be argued
that free speech can lead to a better understanding of the problems prevailing in a
society, the protection of human life, equality, non-discrimination, namely the
fundamental values that enable people to exist together, should also be protected.
This protection will, at times, require certain restrictions on freedom of
expression.
IV. HATE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Regulation of Hate Speech
Societies take different measures to respond to hate speech in accordance
with their historical experiences. For instance, as a result of the second World
War and its bitter memories, the European approach to free speech and its
limitations is considerably different from the United States' approach.
Following the horrors of the Holocaust, European States have been more vigilant
against the harm that might emerge from an unleashed form of speech. For
instance, denial of the Holocaust has been an important problem in Europe.
Consequently, certain European countries have enacted legislation prohibiting
today, and even of the population at large, finding themselves overwhelmed by
the difficulties of life, unemployment and poverty, are only too willing to seek
scapegoats who are held up to them without any real word of caution ....
Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1994).
54. Laura Lederer shows how propaganda influences the minds of its targeted audience:
[H]ate propagandists do not attempt to convince people of their views by
rational argument. They are, instead, concerned first and foremost with action,
with a concerted mass psychological reflexive response, and "seek to short
circuit all thought and decision .... [The individual] must not know that he is
being shaped by outside forces, [yet] some central core in him must be reached
in order to achieve the cooperation and appropriate action the propaganda
desires.
Laura J. Lederer, Pornography and Racist Speech as Hate Propaganda, in THE PRICE WE
PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY 131,
134-35 (quoting Jacques Ellul) (emphasis in original) (alterations in original) (Laura J.
Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., Hill & Wang 1995).
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and criminalizing such speech; 55 the legitimacy of which was accepted by the
Strasbourg organs.56
A society that respects freedom of speech does not have to be one where
there are no restrictions upon the said right. There have always been restrictions
upon free speech, the degree of which is often dependent upon the socio-political
climate of a given period.57 During the period of the Cold War, there were three
main positions with respect to freedom of expression: (a) that of the Soviet
Union and its allies who generally had little enthusiasm for civil and political
rights; (b) the United States who privileged free speech including the category of
hate speech over other values, and (c) Western democracies and developing
countries that tried to keep the balance between liberties and restrictions.
Today's democracies, however, are characterized by two positions: the U.S.
position and the rest of the world.58 Let us now focus on the United States'
approach.
B. The Justification of Free Speech under the First Amendment: The
Marketplace of Ideas
In the United States hate speech is regarded as the price society has to pay
to safeguard freedom of expression. The First Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press ...... 59 Although the First Amendment in
principle protects hate speech, as will be elaborated below, its protection of
speech is not unqualified and does not extend to all forms of expression.
60
While there are various theories behind the protection of free speech, as the
Supreme Court case law demonstrates, judges are reluctant to commit
themselves to any one of the theories. 6 1 The Supreme Court, nonetheless, mostly
relies upon the Millian "marketplace of ideas" theory. 62 In Abrams v. United
55. Adrian Marshall Williams & Jonathan Cooper, Hate Speech, Holocaust Denial and
International Human Rights Law, 6 EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 593, 595-96 (1999).
56. In Europe, trivializing or denying the historical facts of the Holocaust, as well as
justification of National Socialist policy, has been criminalized by various models of legislation in
five countries: Belgium, Germany, France, Spain and Switzerland. Boyle, Hate Speech, supra note
9, at 498.
57. See WALKER, supra note 12, at 1.
58. Boyle, Hate Speech, supra note 9, at 488-89.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
60. Stephen L. Newman, Liberty, Community, and Censorship: Hate Speech and Freedom of
Expression in Canada and the United States, 32 AM. REv. CANADIAN STUD. 369,369 (2002).
61. See generally ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, (2d ed., Oxford U. Press, Inc. 2005)
(1987), at 31-32.
62. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.
964, 964 reprinted in Alexander, supra note 39, at 75, 78-79 (claiming the idea that truth is best
determined through debate, proposed by John Stuart Mills in ON LIBERTY).
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States, where the defendant distributed leaflets in favour of the Russian
revolution, urging workers to strike, so that the arms produced would not be used
against Russian revolutionaries, Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion,
expressed this view very eloquently:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market ... That at any rate is the theory of
our Constitution.... Every year if not every day we have to wager our
salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that
experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and
believe to be fraught with death ....
C. Justifications to Limit Free Speech under the First Amendment.:
1. "Clear and Present Danger" Test
In Schenck v. United States,64 Justice Holmes formulated the famous 'clear
and present danger' test to determine if a certain form of speech should be
restricted. In Schenck, the defendants were convicted of conspiring to violate the
Espionage Act of 1917 by circulating a leaflet that urged resistance to military
recruitment and insubordination in the military. Holmes noted that the character
of every act depends on the circumstances, and that utterances tolerable in
peacetimes can be punishable in wartime. He declared that "[t]he question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
65
2. The New Test: Imminent Lawless Action
In Brandenburg v. Ohio,66 the Supreme Court modified the "clear and
present danger" test. In that case, Mr. Brandenburg had given a speech at a Ku
Klux Klan rally denouncing Blacks and Jews, and declared the necessity of
terrorism and lawlessness. He was convicted under an Ohio criminal
syndicalism law that made it illegal to advocate "crime, sabotage, violence, or
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
63. 250 U.S. 616, 621-22, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
64. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
65. Id. at 52.
66. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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reform."' 67 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the conviction and held
that the said law violated Brandenburg's right to freedom of expression by
replacing the test of "clear and present danger" with a more protective formula.
The Court held that:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action .... "[T]he mere
abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a
resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent
action and steeling it to such action."
' 68
This is the current position on freedom of expression in the context of hate
speech.69 As Anthony Lewis notes, not many utterances would meet the difficult
threshold that the speaker aimed at inciting lawlessness imminently and was
likely to succeed. He further notes that there has been no case since 1969 where
the Supreme Court found that speech should be punished since it satisfied the
test in question.
70
The infamous case of Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life
Activists7 1 is also of relevance to assess how this test was employed in borderline
cases. In this case, a group called the American Coalition of Life Activists
(ACLA) distributed posters, names and addresses of doctors who performed
abortions and posted the information on an internet site called the "Nuremberg
Files"; then crossed out those who had been killed or injured. The site did not
contain any explicit threat or direct encouragement of violence against the
doctors. Yet the doctors sued the ACLA on the ground that the site robbed the
doctors of their anonymity, and the speech hurt them in the sense that it
constituted genuine threats against their security.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that ACLA's speech
did not contain the danger of imminent lawless action, for the speech was "made
in the context of public discourse, not in direct personal communication." 72 The
Court recalled that, although the First Amendment does not protect all forms of
public speech, it protects speech that encourages others to commit violence,
67. Id. at 445.
68. Id. at 447-48 (footnote omitted) (quoting Noto v. U.S., 367 U.S. 290 (1961)).
69. For the other tests employed by the Supreme Court, such as "the probability test" or "bad
tendency test" etc., see Kremnitzer & Ghanayim, supra note 6, at 187-90.
70. Anthony Lewis, Freedom of Speech and Incitement against Democracy, in FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY 7, 8 (David Kretzmer and Francine Kershman
Hazan eds., Kluwer L. tnt'l. 2000).
71. 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001).
72. Id. at 1018.
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unless the speech is capable of producing imminent lawless action. It does not
thus "matter if the speech makes future violence more likely; advocating 'illegal
action at some indefinite future time' is protected." 73 The Court concluded that
"[u]nless ACLA threatened that its members would themselves assault the
doctors, the First Amendment protects its speech."
74
This interpretation of the "imminent lawless action" test has brought the
fundamental principles of criminal law into question. If this conclusion is
accepted then the duty of crime prevention, that is, the necessity of state
institutions to prevent potentially violent situations 75 from erupting into actual
violence, would be omitted for the one value of free speech. Moreover, the
vagueness of the concepts: imminence, lawless action, or indefinite future time,
appears to be at odds with the demands of legal certainty. Indeed, what are the
criteria that will determine whether an utterance will lead to imminent lawless
action? Again, what is meant by indefinite future, or rather, when does
indefinite future become definite and who will determine it? In this context,
should the members of society suffer or lose their lives before the state apparatus
takes action?
3. Freedom of Expression: Beyond the Words
The Skokie76 case is of crucial importance to comprehend the contours of
the hate speech discourse in the United States. In 1977, the National Socialist
Party of America planned to march to Skokie, where the majority of the residents
were Jewish and some 5,000 of them had survived the Holocaust. The
demonstrators were planning to wear facsimiles of German Nazi Party uniforms,
brandishing swastikas and carrying placards with the message "white free
speech." The village of Skokie had asked for a ban arguing that the swastika
represented "fighting words" to the residents of Skokie who are predominantly
of Jewish religion or ancestry. The case worked its way up to the Illinois
Supreme Court where it was held that the swastika was a symbolic form of free
speech that was entitled to protection under the First Amendment:
73. Id. at 1015.
74. Id.
75. Although the site did not contain explicit threats to the doctors, restriction still might have
been placed for the purpose of crime prevention. In this context, in Beauharnais v. Illinois the
Supreme Court stated that
if an utterance directed at an individual may be the object of criminal sanctions,
we cannot deny to a State power to punish the same utterance directed at a
defined group, unless we can say that this is a wilful and purposeless restriction
unrelated to the peace and well-being of the State.
343 U.S. 250, 258 (1951).
76. Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1978).
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The display of the swastika, as offensive to the principles of a free nation as
the memories it recalls may be, is symbolic political speech intended to
convey to the public the beliefs of those who display it. It does not ... fall
within the definition of "fighting words"...
Nor can we find that the swastika, while not representing fighting words, is
nevertheless so offensive and peace threatening to the public that its display
can be enjoined. We do not doubt that the sight of this symbol is abhorrent to
the Jewish citizens of Skokie, and that the survivors of the Nazi persecutions,
tormented by their recollections, may have strong feelings regarding its
display. Yet it is entirely clear that this factor does not justify enjoining
defendants' speech.
77
The Skokie case attracted serious criticisms on the ground that free speech is
not an aim in itself; but a means of realization for the individual, and promotion
of a tolerant and democratic culture. Social inequality is a human creation,
which is created and enforced through power balances, ideologies, words and
images. Social hierarchy thus cannot be maintained without force (be it
legitimate or not), but more importantly not without ideological and linguistic
tools designed to sanction and fortify it.78 If social inequality is not a god-given
phenomenon, but a reality created through acts and words, then the state,
hypothetically being a neutral apparatus between social classes, or ethnic/racial
groups, has a responsibility to diminish the conditions that create inequality in
general and antagonism in particular.
The protection of hate speech hence might at times conflict with the right to
equality, which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Free speech, therefore, should not automatically be given priority
over equality. Particularly in borderline cases the First Amendment should be
balanced by the Fourteenth Amendment, for open debate does not necessarily
constitute a precondition for achieving substantive equality.
79
4. Is Burning a Cross an Expression?
The question whether freedom of expression should include hate speech as
an expressive act that deserves legal protection became a central issue in the
77. Id. at 24.
78. See MAcKINNON, supra note 10, at 15; see also Lisa H. Schwartzman, Hate Speech,
Illocution, and Social Context: A Critique of Judith Butler, 33 J. SOC. PHIL. 421, 437 (2002) (for an
argument that resignification of speech can realistically be materialized within the broader context
of social change).
79. See Fiss, supra note 41, at 12-13; Scott J. Catlin, A Proposal for Regulating Hate Speech in
the United States: Balancing Rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 771, 791-93 (1994).
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R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul case, where the boundaries of free speech were
redefined. This case involved an African American family that moved into a
neighbourhood which predominantly consisted of "white residents." Three
months after their settlement they experienced slashed tires and broken tail-lights
and became the target of racial insults. One day, a cross was set on fire in their
garden. The prime suspect was convicted of trespass and vandalism. The
suspect was convicted of violating the city ordinance that banned
plac[ing] on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,81
religion, or gender ....
However, the Supreme Court quashed the conviction, asserting that the
ordinance violated the right to free speech that is protected under the First
Amendment. It held that the ordinance was invalid because it was both
"overbroad and impermissibly content based and therefore... invalid under the
First Amendment. ' 82 The Court concluded that (a) it was overbroad in the sense
that any such speech used by "proponents of all views," regardless of its content,
could be prohibited; and that (b) it was under inclusive in that it did not include
all fighting words that could also have been punished under the ordinance.
83
Cowan asserts that this decision has affected and jeopardized all state laws
that punish or deter hate speech or hate crimes. 84 Indeed, the argument that the
ordinance was too overbroad or under inclusive can be employed for any legal
code, because legal codes are bound to be deficient or imperfect, sometimes too
narrow, sometimes too broad, which might not correspond to all possible
scenarios. This, however, brings the concept of legal interpretation; a necessary
tool to penetrate the spirit of a given law in concrete cases, into play. The
rationale of the said ordinance was to prevent anger, alarm or frustration on the
basis of race, colour, creed, religion, or gender; i.e., this rationale could have
been employed in interpreting whether a given form of speech or act would
cause such feelings. Above all, it should be remembered that the wording of the
First Amendment is also open to criticism for being too broad: "Congress shall
make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech .... 85 As noted earlier, this
provision is not read as an absolute bar to state regulation of speech but as a
80. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
81. Id. at 380 (quoting Minn. Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 377-78.
84. Cowan, supra note 17, at 248.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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narrow boundary that surrounds the state's authority to prevent potential
arbitrariness.
86
D. The Accepted Limitations
U.S. legislative history is replete with initiatives to prohibit expressions that
the majority considers odious, such as speech that advocates communism, radical
ideas or flag burning, sexually explicit art, group libel, etc. 87 There have also
been attempts to restrict and punish hate speech in the universities since the
1980s as a consequence of growing racism on campuses. 88 However, attempts to
restrict free speech, except for certain restrictions carried out in the name of
national security, did not receive much support in the U.S. jurisprudence.
The First Amendment thus protects free speech to an extent that many
people might find it disturbing. The robust approach of the First Amendment is
perhaps best summarized by the defence lawyer in a case against the leader of
the Aryan Nations, where he noted that: "[D]emonizing Jews is still legal under
the First Amendment. It is still legal in this country to be a bigot. It is still legal
to hate." 89 Similarly, in Texas v. Johnson, Justice Brennan stated that "[i]f there
is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable."
' 90
1. Fighting Words and Obscenity: Words of No Value
One of the most important exceptions to free speech was formulated in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, where a Jehovah's Witness called a city marshal
a "God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist" in a public place. 9 1 He was
convicted of violating a New Hampshire law that made it a crime to "address any
offensive, derisive or annoying word to any[one] ... who is lawfully in any
street or other public place, nor call him by an offensive or derisive name .... 92
The U.S. Supreme Court found the conviction justifiable:
[T]he right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
86. BARENDT, supra note 6 1, at 31.
87. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 48, at 113.
88. See id. at 128-29. However, such hate speech codes when challenged in the Court were
mostly found unconstitutional due to their 'vagueness' or overbroad character. See John Doe v.
Univ. of Mi., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866-67 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
89. Boyle, Hate Speech, supra note 9, at 489 (alteration in original); see also Jo Thomas,
Courthouse Klan-Fighter Takes on Aryan Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2000, at Al4.
90. 491 U.S. 397,414 (1989).
91. 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1941).
92. Id.
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speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality. 'Resort to epithets or personal abuse is
not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded
by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no
question under that instrument.'
9 3
The restriction of the so-called "fighting words," or obscenity94 is mainly
based on two assumptions that (a) such words by their very utterance are capable
of causing injury or inciting a breach of public peace; and (b) that their utterance
is of no intellectual value in the sense that they do not contribute to the
establishment of truth. If these hypotheses are accepted, then it is arguable that
pornography 95 and racial or religious insults might also fall in this category,
since they might also, by their very utterance, cause resentment or breach public
peace.
However, in Gooding v. Wilson the Court narrowed the definition of
"fighting" words, and stated that not all offensive words fall under Chaplinsky's
"fighting" words doctrine; "fighting" words are those that have "a direct
tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the
remark is addressed. ' 96  The new standard of causing acts of violence by an
individual, rather than a group, to whom the offensive remark is addressed
establishes a high threshold. It is difficult to comprehend why a group to whom
an offensive remark is addressed should be excluded from this category, and that
93. Id. at 571-72 (quoting Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)).
94. In Roth v. United States, it was held "that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech or press," either (1) under the First Amendment, as to the Federal Government, or
(2) under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
Obscenity is a vague term which is difficult to define. Although Miller v. California sets out basic
guidelines to determine what can be considered obscenity, the difficulty of defining the term
remains. Justice Steward's famous formula is meaningful in this respect: "I know it when I see
it..." Jocobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
95. Child Pornography is another category of speech that is not protected under the First
Amendment. See generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). Since it is not the focus of
this article to discuss thoroughly all the limitations in detail, it should merely be noted that the
reasons that were given in Ferber for the prohibition of child pornography can also be employed
for banning adult pornography. It appears that the sensitivity towards child abuse, high degree of
vulnerability for the victims of abuse, and fundamental moral or religious values played a major
role in arriving at such a conclusion.
96. 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1971); JACOBS & PorrER, supra note 48, at 113.
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there should be the requirement of possible ensuing violent result. Sometimes
words can cause irreversible harm by their mere utterance. After this higher
threshold, the Supreme Court has not upheld "a conviction under the fighting
words doctrine." 97 Rather, the Court, reversing the fighting words doctrine of
Chaplinsky even further, held that "sometimes [fighting words] are quite
expressive indeed."
' 98
2. Group Libel
In the United States there have also been attempts to restrict speech that
vilify racial or religious groups, known as group libel.99 The group libel doctrine
was employed in the well-known case of Beauharnais v. Illinois,100 where the
Court upheld a 1917 Illinois law that made it a crime to defame a race or class of
people. The defendant was the president of the White Circle League of
America, who had been convicted under the said law for distributing a leaflet
''calling on the Mayor and City Council of Chicago 'to halt the further
encroachment, harassment and invasion of white people, their property,
neighborhoods and persons, by the Negro... [and urging] white people in
Chicago to unite... to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by
the negro... ." "102 The Court, rather than handling the case under the "fighting
words" doctrine, invoked the group libel doctrine as an exception to the First
Amendment and held that the civil unrest and riots in Chicago necessitated such
criminal penalties since offensive literature had posed a serious threat to public
peace and order.
However, the Beauharnais case, although not overruled, has little
continuing vitality. Indeed, in the landmark case of New York Times v.
Sullivan, 163 the Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of
all statements about the conduct of public officials even though they might be
false; and that in order to prevail in a suit, the plaintiff must prove the statement
involved "was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was
97. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 48, at 113-14. Professor Gerald Gunther, the eminent
constitutional scholar, rightly points out that "one must wonder about the strength of an exception
which, while theoretically recognized, has ever since 1942 not been found to be apt in practice. Id.
at 114.
98. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992); see also Edward J. Cleary, Beyond the
Burning Cross: The First Amendment and the Landmark R.A. V. Case, 108 HARV. L. REV. 757
(1995).
99. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 48, at 114.
100. 343 U.S. 250 (1951).
101. See Joseph Tanenhaus, Group Libel and Free Speech, 13 PHYLON 215, 215-16 (1952); see
also Crime Comics and the Constitution, 7 STAN. L. REV. 237, 240-42 (1995).
102. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 252.
103. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 104 Moreover, the
Court stated that to be successful in a case, any libelous statement had to be
directed at the individual, rather than a group. Consequently, it appears that the
"knowingly false" test along with the individual grievance requirement simply
rendered the group libel exception ineffective. 105
3. Sedition
National security has been the most important exception to the free speech
doctrine under the First Amendment. Indeed, not until Brandenburg106 was the
tension between national security and free speech resolved to a certain extent.
As Justice William Brennan notes, although the United States has been
"adamant... about civil liberties during peacetime, it has a long history of
failing to preserve civil liberties when it perceived its national security
threatened.... After each perceived security crisis ended the United States has
remorsefully realized that the abrogation of civil liberties was unnecessary."10 7
The first exception made under this heading was the Alien and Sedition Act
of 1798, which was enacted under the threat of war with France for security
reasons. The act, in practice, was employed to quell any political opposition
from the Republicans. Yet, the act was never ruled upon in the Supreme
Court. 10 8  The second important exception to free speech came with the
Espionage Act of 1917, which made it a crime, inter alia, to "cause or attempt to
cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or
naval forces."' 109 Under this act more than two thousand people were prosecuted.
The majority of the convictions were based on nonconformist opinions about the
war which were treated as false statements of fact because they conflicted with
Congress resolutions or the statements made by President Wilson. The Sedition
Act of 1918 went further, making it illegal "also to 'wilfully utter, print, write, or
publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about' the U.S
[sic] form of government .... ,,110 The above-mentioned cases of Schenck 1
104. Id. at 279-80.
105. JACOBS & POTrER, supra note 48, at 116.
106. Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
107. William J. Brennan, The American Experience: Free Speech and National Security, in FREE
SPEECH AND NATIONAL SECURITY 10 (Shimon Shetreet ed., Martinus Nijhoff Pub. 1991).
108. Id. at 11-14.
109. Espionage Act of 1917 Paul Hoffman & Kate Martin, Safeguarding Liberty: National
Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information: United States ofAmerica, in SECRECY
AND LIBERTY: NATIONAL SECURITY, FREEDOM OF ExPREssION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION 477,
477 (Sandra Coliver et al. eds., Martinus Nijoff Pub. 1999).
110. Brennan, supra note 107, at 14.
111. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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and Abrams112 belong to this period where the scope of the "clear and present
danger" test was at times forcefully extended. For instance, in Debs v. United
States, a leader of the American Socialist Party was convicted of violating the
draft law by merely uttering the following words: "You have your lives to
lose.. . you need to know that you are fit for something better than slavery and
cannon fodder."' 113 Justice Holmes noted that his speech had a natural tendency
to obstruct the draft. 114 This period thus witnessed severe restrictions of speech
in the name of national security. '15
4. Cold War and Free Speech
The free speech discourse was also affected by the reality of the Cold War.
During this period, exaggerated security concerns resulted in prosecuting
communists under the Smith Act, which along with others made it a crime
to become a member of or "to organize any society ... advocat[ing] ... the
overthrow or destruction of any government of the United States by force or
violence" or "to print ... any written or printed material advocating...
the ... propriety" of such overthrow or destruction with the intent to cause it
to come about. 116
The McCarthy era was punctuated with a witch-hunt for communists or
"subversives." A landmark case representing this period is Dennis v. United
States, 1 7 where the conviction of the Communist Party leaders was affirmed by
the Court thereby broadening the scope of the "clear and present danger" test.
The Court noted that the words clear and present danger "cannot mean that
before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be
executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited."' 118 Thus, as
Brennan notes, the Court reinterpreted, "the 'clear and present danger' test in a
way that emasculated it and effectively upheld a limitation on speech where the
danger was neither clear nor present."
' 119
The hysteria as to the communist threat ended with the realization that the
threat in question was not of a grave nature. As noted above, with the
Brandenburg case, which swept away the Dennis decision, the Court
acknowledged the right to speak freely about violent action and even revolution
unless this poses an immediate threat.
112. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
113. 249 U.S. 211,214 (1919).
114. Id. at 211.
115. See Hoffman & Martin, supra note 109, at 478-79.
116. Brennan, supra note 107, at 17.
117. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
118. Id. at 509 (emphasis in original).
119. Brennan, supra note 107, at 17.
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5. September 11 Attacks and Restrictions on Civil Liberties
It is arguable that in the United States the vigorous emphasis over civil
rights, sometimes at the expense of other rights, has a pattern of losing its
significance during national security crises. As Justice Brennan rightly posits,
the main problem in the United States does not lie in the recognition of civil
liberties during times of warfare or national crisis, but rather the inability of
questioning the alleged dangers purportedly threatening the nation during such a
period. 1
20
Likewise, following September 11 attacks, exaggerated security concerns
led to the imposition of serious restrictions on civil liberties, such as civil
protests, 12 1 speech that is considered to be inflammatory for terrorist activities,
and the right to privacy with the introduction of surveillance techniques without
checks. Furthermore, discriminatory treatment of non-citizens and tightened
immigration policies, particularly curbing the entrance of Arab or Afghan
Muslims, 122 and policies aiming at the exclusion of immigrants lacking proper
papers, has become quite widespread as a trade-off between liberties and
security. 123  During this period not only freedom of expression and anti-
discrimination laws were breached, 124 but also, arbitrary killings,
125 torture, 126
120. Id. at 15.
121. See United for Peace and Justice v. City of N.Y., 323 F.3d 175, 176 (2d Cir. 2003) (denying
the allocation of any location other than a restricted area to a group opposing to the policies of the
Bush Administration was not found to be an unnecessary burden to the group's right to free
speech).
122. As some commentators suggest, the exclusion of liberal Muslim leaders from entering the
U.S. due to their religion might also curb alternative and tolerant views from circulating in the
marketplace of ideas. Laura K. Donohue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 328 (2005-06).
123. See MICHAEL R. RONCZKOWSKI, TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED HATE CRIME: INTELLIGENCE
GATHERING, ANALYSIS, AND INVESTIGATIONS 60 (CRC Press 2004).
124. Also the security hysteria has led severe restrictions, arrests, surveillance and violence
against those that have marched and demonstrated against the current government policies
particularly concerning the war on terror, and drastic restrictions on civil liberties. See Mary M.
Cheh, Demonstrations, Security Zones, and First Amendment Protection of Special Places, 8
D.C.L. REV. 53, 75 (2004).
125. For information as to the indiscriminate killing of innocent Iraqi people by an American
private military company (Blackwater), see Blackwater in Hot Water, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 11,
2007 at 51.
126. One of the most effective coercive techniques used by the U.S. is waterboarding, which
consists of immobilizing an individual and pouring water over his face to stimulate drowning,
making the subject to believe that his death in imminent. "[T]he threat that another person will
imminently be subjected to death .... " constitutes, among other things, torture under U.S. law.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(D) (2004). Also the U.N. Convention against Torture prohibits the
infliction of severe physical and mental suffering. See generally Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc.
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secret detentions, denial of fair trial rights, 127 spiriting prisoners to CIA's ghost
prisons, 128 kidnapping terror suspects for delivery to other countries for purposes
of interrogation, (a practice known as "extraordinary rendition") became
widespread. 129 Space does not allow us to elaborate further on this point, thus it
is merely to be reiterated that the United States follows a pattern of restricting
civil liberties in times of national crisis. It is thus proper to quote Justice
Brandeis, who wisely noted that "[e]xperience should teach us to be most on our
guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent."13
0
A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984), entered into force June 26, 1987. Although the Bush Administration has
never formally acknowledged the existence of torture, (which includes other techniques such as the
so-called "attention grab," "attention slap," "belly slap," "long time standing," and "cold cell,")
Vice President Cheney "famously responded to a question about a 'dunk in the water' for terrorism
suspects by saying that to him 'it was a no-brainer that it was an acceptable interrogation
technique."' Massimo Calabresi, Squeezing Mukasey on Torture, TIME, Oct. 30, 2007, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1677612,00.html; Michael Cooper & Marc
Santora, McCain Rebukes Giuliani on Waterboarding Remark, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2007, at A23,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/26/us/politics/26giuliani.html; Brian Ross &
Richard Esposito, CIA's Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described, ABC NEWS, Nov. 18, 2005,
available at http://abcnews.go.comiWNT/Investigation/story?id=1322866. It is reported that
"[flalse evidence of links between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda was provided by a terror suspect
who was handed over by the United States to Egypt" where he was subjected to an enhanced
interrogation. A Noble Vision Lost, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Dec. 11, 2005, at 16, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/article757265.ece.
127. For instance, Section 412 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, known as the Patriot
Act, provides for the mandatory detention of suspected terrorists. This section empowers the
Attorney General to detain any alien whom he certifies as a terrorist. The detainee may be kept in
custody indefinitely, as long as the Attorney General determines, in his sole discretion that the
release of the alien would threaten national security or the safety of general public or any
individual. U.S.A. Patriot Act § 412, 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2006). The Patriot Act resembles the
Emergency Detention Act of 1950, which was enacted during the McCarthy era in reaction to the
Communist hysteria. Van Bergen & Valentine, supra note 30, at 451-452; see also Jens
Meierhenrich, Analogies at War, 11 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 1, 28-29 (2006).
128. The very purpose of such secret prisons, sometimes referred to as "black sites," is to evade
legal responsibility. These prisons are located overseas, including several countries in Eastern
Europe, for they are illegal in the United States. Doug Cassel, Washington's "War against
Terrorism" and Human Rights: The View from Abroad, 33 HuM. RTS. 11, 11 (2006). In 2004, a
ghost prison in Guantanamo was shut down as the Supreme Court concluded that the US exercised
"'complete jurisdiction and control' over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base .... " Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466, 501 (2004) (quoting Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, art.
II, Feb. 16-Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 418).
129. Extraordinary rendition is used for taking the suspected individuals into gray areas where
there exist harsher conditions to extract information. Cassel, supra note 128, at 112.
130. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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E. Does the U.S. Comply with its International Obligations?
As shown below, hate speech is strictly restricted under the current frame of
international law. The United States, however, has put reservations on the
relevant articles of international instruments on the ground that such measures do
not comply with the U.S. constitution, thus refusing to take affirmative action to
eliminate hate speech. Irrespective of the controversy as to whether any
restriction on free speech is constructive, it is to be emphasized that the U.S.
does not comply with international standards. Instead, the U.S. depends on its
solid civil rights tradition, which sometimes results in the omission of the
protection of other values, of particular importance is the right to be free from
discrimination and the principle of equality. Most importantly, the U.S. does not
have a perfect record of protecting political speech in times of national crisis.
131
"A jurisprudence," as Justice Brennan correctly points out, "that is capable of
sustaining the supremacy of civil liberties over exaggerated claims of national
security only in times of peace is, of course, useless at the moment that civil
liberties are most in danger."'
132
V. HATE SPEECH UNDER CERD, ICCPR, AND EUROPEAN CONVENTION
A. The Prohibition of Hate Speech under the CERD
International law encourages states to introduce legislation that limits or
penalizes hate speech, particularly when it incites criminal behaviour.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) 13 3 is the most comprehensive codification concerning
the prohibition of hate speech and the eradication of racial discrimination at the
international level. States under CERD are required to condemn all forms of
racial discrimination and to adopt necessary measures to eradicate it. 134 The
131. Indeed, following 9/11 security concerns tightened the restrictions on "inflammatory
language or potential hidden messages" that might incite terrorist activities. Donahue, supra note
122, at 327 n.534. Also by widespread detention of terror suspects, and exclusion of liberal
Muslim leaders from entering the U.S. on the basis of their religion, the free speech discourse is
restricted and alternative views as to the concept of Jihad is prevented to from development. See
id. at 328.
132. William J. Brennan, The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of
Security Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 11, 14 (1988).
133. See generally International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965) [hereinafter
ICERD].
134. The notion of the elimination of racial discrimination is also covered by Articles 1 (2) and
55(c) of the United Nations Charter, Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
common Article 2 of both International Covenants on Human Rights. Karl Josef Partsch, Racial
Speech and Human Rights: Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, in STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-
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Contracting Parties are also required to guarantee everyone's right to equality
before the law, along with various civil, political, economic, social and cultural
rights.
Article 4 of the Convention is highly detailed and specific, which, inter
alia, provides that States Parties "[s]hall declare an offence punishable by law all
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial
discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against
any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin .... ,135 It also
places a duty on states to prohibit racial organizations and to declare it an offence
to participate in such associations.
To date, 173 states have become party to the Convention, which
demonstrates the international consensus on the notion of the elimination of
racism in general and hate speech in particular. However, there are some
problematic areas that jeopardize the effectiveness of the Convention. First, the
introductory paragraph of article 4 envisages that "States Parties ... undertake
to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to,
or acts of .. . discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly
set forth in article 5 of this Convention .... 136
There exists a dispute over the meaning of the so-called 'with due regard'
clause. The first school of thought, advocated by the United States, argues that
States Parties are not authorized to adopt any measure which would in any way
impair or limit the rights envisaged in the above-mentioned human rights
instruments. The second perspective, which is mainly adopted by Canada,
Austria, Italy and France, takes the position that States Parties must strike a
balance between the fundamental freedoms and the duties enshrined in the
Convention. Accordingly, the guarantees are not absolute, but they are subject to
the limitations authorized in the relevant instruments. According to the third
interpretation, which was adopted by UN Human Rights Division in Geneva
1979, States Parties may not avoid enacting legislation to implement the
Convention in the name of protecting civil rights. In other words, this approach
denies that the "with due regard" clause has any influence on the obligations of
Contracting Parties. This view was rightly criticized on the ground that it did not
take account of Article 30 of the Universal Declaration, where nothing in the
declaration may be interpreted as implying for any state, group or person any
DISCRIMINATION 21, 21 (Sandra Coliver et al., eds., 1992). It is argued that ICERD's strongly
preventive and vigorous mode came as a response to the revival of anti-semitism and the then
growing concern of apartheid. See generally Patrick Thornberry, Confronting Racial
Discrimination: A CERD Perspective, 5 HuM. RTS. L. REv. 239 (2005).
135. ICERD, supra note 133, at art. 4(a).
136. Id. art. 4 (emphasis added).
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right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of
any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.'
3 7
It is important to note that the effectiveness of the Convention had been
weakened by a number of reservations 138 limiting the obligations of states under
Article 4 by reference to the right to freedom of expression. It is arguable that
while in the international sphere there is a strong will to eliminate the
phenomena of discrimination and hate speech, the means to achieve this goal
varies. Certain states do not want to adopt the radical solution that Article 4
provides; instead they wish to retain the discretion to determine exactly how they
will implement their obligations under the Convention, 139 which to a certain
extent renders the Convention toothless.
1. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
In order to clarify the scope and requirements of Article 4, the Committee
issued General Comment VII and General Recommendation XV after the
examination of country reports, declarations and the above-mentioned
reservations. In General Recommendation VII, the Committee emphasized the
mandatory character of article 4 and recommended States Parties to satisfy the
140requirements stipulated therein. In General Recommendation XV, the
Committee went further by noting that "States Parties have not only to enact
appropriate legislation but also to ensure that it is effectively enforced. Because
threats and acts of racial violence easily lead to other such acts and generate an
atmosphere of hostility, only immediate intervention can meet the obligations of
effective response.07
137. See Partsch, supra note 134, at 23-25.
138. See David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445,449 (1987).
139. The United States, for instance, declared that:
The Constitution of the United States contains provisions for the protection of
individual rights, such as the right of free speech, and nothing in the Convention
shall be deemed to require or to authorize legislation or other action by the United
States of America incompatible with the provisions of the Constitution of the
United States of America.
LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA 254 (Oxford U. Press 1986). Likewise, the United Kingdom
declared that "[i]t interprets Article 4 as requiring a party to the Convention to adopt
further legislative measures.., only in so far as it may consider... necessary for the
attainment of the end specified in the earlier part of Article 4." NATAN LERNER, THE U.N.
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 53 (Sijthoff
& Noordhoff2d ed. 1980).
140. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Gen. Rec. 7, Measures to Eradicate
Incitement to or Acts of Discrimination, 120, U.N. Doc. A/40/18 (1985).
141. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Gen. Rec. 15, Report of the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 2, U.N.Doc. A/48/18 (Mar. 17, 1993).
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The Committee went on to note that:
Article 4 (a) requires States parties to penalize four categories of misconduct:
(i) dissemination of ideas based upon racial superiority or hatred; (ii)
incitement to racial hatred; (iii) acts of violence against any race or group of142
persons of another colour or ethnic origin; and (iv) incitement to such acts.
The Committee, as a response to the opposition of some States Parties, very
clearly emphasized "that article 4 (b) places a greater burden upon" States Parties
to declare racist organizations illegal and punish participation in such
organizations. 143 The Committee further pointed out that "the prohibition of the
dissemination of all ideas based upon racial superiority or hatred is compatible
with the right to freedom of opinion and expression.... The citizen's exercise of
this right carries special duties and responsibilities .... 144
The Committee gave strong indications that in case of a dilemma between
the exercise of free speech and the right to equality and non-discrimination the
balance would likely be tilted towards the latter rights. 14 5  The Committee
reiterated this strong position in its recent and quite significant opinion
concerning a communication (The Jewish community of Oslo et al. v. Norway)
146
submitted by the Jewish community of Oslo and Trondheim and the Norwegian
Antiracist Centre. On August 19, 2000, a group, called the Bootboys, organized
"a march in commemoration of the Nazi leader Rudolf Hess ...... 1 The march
was headed by Mr. Sjolie who made the following statement: "[w]e are gathered
here to honor our great hero, Rudolf Hess, for his brave attempt to save Germany
and Europe from Bolshevism and Jewry during the Second World War." He
went on to state that "[e]very day immigrants rob, rape and kill Norwegians, ...
our people and country are being plundered and destroyed by the Jews, who suck
our country empty of wealth and replace it with immoral and un-Norwegian
[values]." 148
Mr. Sjolie was convicted under 135a of the Norwegian Penal Code, which
"prohibits a person from threatening, insulting, or subjecting to hatred,
persecution or contempt, any person or group of persons because of their creed,
race, color or national or ethnic origin."' 4 9  However, his conviction was
142. Id. 3.
143. Id. 6.
144. Id. 4.
145. See Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Gen. Rec. 30, Discrimination
against Non-Citizens, 2, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc. 1 l/rev.3 (Oct. 1, 2004).
146. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Comm'n No. 30/2003, 1, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/67/D/30/2003 (Aug. 22, 2005) [hereinafter CERD No. 30].
147. Id. T2.1.
148. Id. (emphasis omitted).
149. Id. 2.5.
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overturned by the Supreme Court on the ground that penalizing the "approval of
Nazism would involve prohibiting Nazi organizations, which" then would "be
incompatible with the right to freedom of speech."' 150 The majority of the Court
concluded that the speech "did not amount to approval of the persecution and
mass extermination of the Jews, .. . " but it merely expressed support for
National Socialist ideology. 151
The Committee, in contrast, observed that while the contents of the speech
were absurd, this was not relevant for assessment under Article 4. It "considers
these statements to contain ideas on racial superiority or hatred" that amounted• 152
to "incitement at least to racial discrimination, if not to violence." The
Committee also noted that:
[T]he principle of freedom of speech has been afforded a lower level of
protection in cases of racist and hate speech dealt with by other international
bodies.... the prohibition of all ideas based upon racial superiority or hatred
is compatible with the right to freedom of opinion and expression. ... '[D]ue
regard' clause relates generally to all principles embodied in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, not only freedom of speech. Thus, to give the
right to freedom of speech a more limited role in the context of article 4 does153
not deprive the due regard clause of significant meaning ....
The Committee concluded that the acquittal of Mr. Sjolie by the Supreme
Court of Norway gave rise to violations of Articles 4 and 6 of the CERD. This
opinion provides concrete guidelines for assessing whether a given speech would
be compatible with article 4 of the CERD. However, the answer is not yet given
as to whether criminal punishment is an appropriate way to prevent, or rather
eliminate racial discrimination. It is widely held that criminal punishment or
suppression of ideas may help in the short term, but it is unrealistic to expect to
eliminate racism by punishing those who advocate it. 154 This question will be
examined further below.
150. Id. 2.7 (footnote omitted).
151. Id.
152. CERD No. 30, supra note 146, at 10.4.
153. Id. 10.5.
154. Partsch claims, "[t]he danger exists that the offender found guilty of a discriminatory act,
far from changing his attitudes, may become even more stubborn and confirmed in his convictions.
Public proceedings in a court may also, inadvertently, provide the offender with the opportunity to
publicize his racist views." Partsch, supra note 134, at 27-8.
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B. Hate Speech under the ICCPR
The right to freedom of expression is set forth in Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 155 which, among
other things, provides that "[e]veryone shall have the right to hold opinions
without interference."' 156 The articulation of the right by the United Nations is
different from the expression of the European Convention; unlike the European
Convention, the right, independent of the right to freedom of expression,
contains the concept of holding opinions without interference. The Committee,
in its General Comment 10, also highlighted that unlike the right to freedom of
expression, "the right to hold opinions without interference" is not subject to any
exception or restriction. 157
Article 19 (2) protects the right to freedom of expression that includes the
"freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice. "' The concept of freedom of
expression, in this respect, is considered to be inseparably linked with the right to
freedom of information and wider than mere speech including non-verbal forms
of expression. 159 The right to information, no doubt, is not only indispensable
for equipping the citizen with necessary tools to participate in the democratic
process of self government; but also for the effective control of public
administration. 16
0
1. Limitations on the Right to Freedom of Expression
Under the ICCPR the exercise of free speech is not absolute, for it "carries
. ... .. , 16 1
with it special duties and responsibilities." As the Committee stressed, the
scope of the individual's right is determined by the interplay between freedom of
expression and legitimate limitations or restrictions. 162
155. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
156. Id. art. 19.
157. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 10: Freedom of Expression (Art. 19), 1, U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1 (Jun. 29, 1983) [hereinafter Expression].
158. ICCPR, supra note 155, at art. 19(2).
159. See David Feldman, Freedom of Expression, in THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND UNITED KINGDOM LAW 391, 394 (David Harris & Sarah Joseph eds.,
Clarendon Press 1995).
160. LoUKIS G. LOUCAIDES, The Right to Information, in ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOPING LAW OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 20 (Martinus Nijhoff Pub. 1995); see also JAMES MADISON, THE COMPLETE
MADISON: HIS BASIC WRITINGS 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., Harper & Bros. 1988).
161. ICCPR, supra note 155, at art. 19(3).
162. See Expression, supra note 157, at 2.
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As stated earlier, national authorities, under the pretext of restricting the
extreme forms of speech, might abuse their authority to suppress political
dissidents. Having this consideration in mind, the Committee also expressed the
view that
when a State party imposes certain restrictions on the exercise of freedom of
expression, these may not put in jeopardy the right itself.... [T]he restrictions
must be "provided by law"; they may only be imposed for one of the purposes
set out ... and they must be justified as being "necessary" for that State party
for one of those purposes.163
The enumerated restrictions should thus be read narrowly. For instance, in
Tae Hoon Park v. the Republic of Korea, the Committee rejected the vaguely
formulated defence of national security, holding that the State Party had failed to
specify the precise nature of the threat. The Committee noted that "freedom of
expression is of paramount importance in any democratic society, and an
restrictions to the exercise of this right must meet a strict test of justification."'V
2. Article 20 of the ICCPR: A Specific Restriction
Under the ICCPR, freedom of expression may also be limited by invoking
Article 20 of the Covenant, which requires States Parties to prohibit by law any
"propaganda for war" and "[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence . . . . 165 The
necessity for implementing this article was subjected to controversy by States
Parties. Indeed, during the drafting of this article some states expressed their
concern about the adoption of such an article on the ground that it may lead to
abuse and have a detrimental impact upon the right to freedom of expression.
They argued that legislation would not be an effective method of dealing with
the problem of national, racial, religious hostility, and that if propaganda for war
or advocacy of hatred posed a serious threat to public peace, Article 19 (3) could
be invoked. Advocates of the article particularly emphasized the detrimental
effect of propaganda and hate speech that played an important role in the
escalation of fascist ideology. 1
66
163. Id. 4.
164. Tae Hoon Park v. Rep. of Korea, Comm'n No. 628/1995, 10.3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/64/D/628/1995 (Nov. 3, 1998).
165. ICCPR, supra note 155, at art. 20.
166. Ineke Boerefijn and Joana Oyediran, Article 20 of the international Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, in STRIKING A BALANCE, HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-
DISCRIMINATION 29, 29 (Sandra Coliver et al., eds., 1992); see Dominic McGoldrick & Th~rse
O'Donnell, Hate-speech Laws: Consistency with National and International Human Rights Law,
18 LEGAL STUD. 453,471 (1998).
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The Committee, in this regard, declared that the "prohibitions are fully
compatible with the right of freedom of expression as contained in article 19, the
exercise of which carries with it special duties and responsibilities."16 7  The
Committee further noted that the "provisions of article 20, paragraph 1, do not
prohibit advocacy of the sovereign right of self-defence or the right of peoples to
self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter."
168
The jurisprudence of the Committee, nevertheless, provides only limited
clarification as to the relationship between Articles 19 and 20. The case of
Faurisson v. France16 9 is an important example wherein the Committee clarified
its position with respect to speech that involves Holocaust-denial. In this case,
the author (Mr. Faurisson) in an interview expressed his personal conviction that
there had been no homicidal gas chambers for the extermination of Jews in Nazi
concentration camps. The conviction of the author was based on the Gayssot
Act, which made it an offence to contest the existence of the category of crimes
against humanity as defined in the London Charter. The Committee firstly
examined the legitimacy of the restriction and concluded that the restriction
satisfied the principle of legality. 170 The next step was to determine whether or
not the restriction was imposed for a legitimate purpose. The Committee
observed that the author's statements, when read in their full context, "were of a
nature as to raise or strengthen anti-semitic feelings, the restriction served the
respect of the Jewish community to live free from fear in an atmosphere of anti-
semitism."17t The final test was whether the restriction was necessary for the
aim. The argument of the French government, that the revisionist discourse was
a vehicle for the dissemination of anti-Semitic views and that the restriction was
adapted as a measure against racism and anti-Semitism was ultimately upheld by
the Committee. The Committee accordingly held that the restriction on the
applicant's right to freedom of expression was necessary within the meaning of
the Covenant. The Committee unfortunately neither elaborated upon the difficult
relationship between freedom of expression and the need to protect society from
racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and other ills, nor discussed whether or not
167. Hum. Rts. Comm., Gen. Comment 11, Article 20, 2, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/Rev. 3 (1983).
168. Id. Today, the right to self-determination is asserted by Palestinians, Tibetans and
Kashmiri, East Timorese, Puerto Ricans, Zulus, Kurds and by many other indigenous and racial
groups. The exclusion of the advocacy of self-determination from the prohibition requirement
does not carry a practical value, particularly given that the scope and implications of the right to
self-determination is vague and controversial in international law. See Robert McCorquodale, Self-
Determination: a Human Rights Approach, 43 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 857, 857-885 (1994).
169. Faurisson v. France, 115 I.L.R. 356, 9.5 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. 1996).
170. Id.
171. Id. T9.6.
[Vol. 16:1
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND HATE SPEECH
Mr. Faurisson's statements could have been considered as "incitement" within
the meaning of article 20 (2).172
In the case of JR. T. and the W. G. Party v. Canada,173 in which Article 20
was directly invoked, a political party (W.G. Party) wanted to attract
membership and promote the party's policies via tape-recorded messages that
anybody could listen to simply by dialing a number. The messages were meant
to warn any caller of "the dangers of international finance and international
Jewry leading the world into wars, unemployment and inflation and the collapse
of world values and principles."' 7 4 Although the author claimed that his right to
freedom of expression was curtailed, the Human Rights Committee found the
application inadmissible on the ground that the opinions that the applicant sought
to disseminate through the telephone system obviously constituted the advocacy
of racial or religious hatred, which Canada had an obligation under Article 20 (2)
of the Covenant to prohibit. 175 The decision of the Committee, although clearly
indicating that Article 20 can legitimately be invoked for restricting the right to
freedom of expression and that states are obliged to ban speech that incites
hatred, does not provide a solid rationale for the justification as to how Article 20
is to be invoked in the face of hate speech.
Similarly, in Ross v. Canada,17 6 a teacher, who published anti-Semitic
tracts outside the classroom, was disciplined by being transferred to a non-
teaching position. The restrictions imposed were held not to violate Article 19,
as they were grounded upon the "purpose of protecting the 'rights or reputations'
of persons of Jewish faith, including the right to have an education in the public
school system free from bias, prejudice and intolerance."17 7  The Committee,
citing its Faurisson decision, briefly touched upon the nexus between Articles 19
and 20, noting that "[s]uch restrictions also derive support from the principles
reflected in art 20(2) of the covenant." 178 It is yet to be seen whether the
Committee will further elaborate upon the said nexus in a concrete fashion.
172. Id. For such a discussion, though not in detail, see the concurring opinion of Elizabeth
Evatt, David Kretzmer, Eckart Klein and Rajsoomer Lallah.
173. Hum. Rts. Comm., Comm'n No. 104/1981, J.R.T. & the W.G. Party v. Canada, 1, U.N.
Doc. CCPRJC/OP/2 at 25 (Apr. 6, 1983).
174. Id. 2.
175. Id. 8(b).
176. Hum. Rts. Comm., Comm'n No. 736/1997, Ross v. Canada, 11.5, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997 (Oct. 18, 2000).
177. Id.
178. Id.
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C. Hate Speech under the European Convention
1. The Right to Freedom of Expression & its Limitations under the
European Convention
Unlike the approach adopted by the drafters of the First Amendment to the
US Constitution, the European tradition does not regard freedom of expression
as an absolute value. As can be observed from the case law, the system
acknowledges certain limitations to the right of freedom of expression as
envisaged under Article 10 (2). 179 Yet, within the limitations hate speech is not
enlisted as a specific category. 18  It is therefore important to understand the
underlying principles of the Convention system to determine how and when
speech can be restricted. The Convention 181sets out restrictions for the interests
of national security, territorial integrity, for the protection of public order, health,
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Restrictions
should be imposed for specific aims that are provided by law; and they should be
proportionate and necessary in a democratic society. 182
In the Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom, the Court held that,
"Freedom of expression.., is subject to a number of exceptions which... must
be narrowly interpreted and the necessity for any restrictions must be
convincingly established."' 18 3  Similarly, in the Sunday Times case, the court
emphasized that the right to freedom of expression is the rule and its limitations
are the exceptions.18 4 Also the right was not to be balanced with the competing
principles, but merely to be subjected to narrowly construed limitations. To
this end, the Court examines whether national authorities limited the right
reasonably, carefully and in good faith; and whether a given restriction was
proportionate and justified by convincing reasons. 186  Strasbourg organs
established certain criteria for determining the legitimacy of a limitation imposed
by national authorities. For instance, the expression "prescribed by law" meant
179. See Mahoney & Early, supra note 4, at 109.
180. DONNA GOMIEN, DAVID HARRIS & LEO ZWAAK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 273 (Council of Eur. Pub.
1999).
181. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. I et seq.,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
182. CLARE OVEY & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, JACOBS & WHITE: EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 278 (Oxford U. Press 3d ed., 2002).
183. Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 153, 59 (1992).
184. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245, 165 (1979).
185. Id.; see also Boyle, Freedom, supra note 8, at 2.
186. STEVEN GREER, THE EXCEPTIONS TO ARTICLES 8 TO II OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 14 (Council of Eur. Pub 1997).
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that the interference should have a legal basis 187 and that domestic law should
also be compatible with the minimum requirements of the rule of law. 188 The
quality that any legal norm shouldpossess, be it in a written or unwritten form,
was specified in the Sunday Times' 89 judgment:
First, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have
an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable
to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as 'law' unless it is
formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his
conduct ....190
As to the legitimate aim requirement, the list of legitimate aims set forth in
Article 10(2) is exhaustive, not illustrative. State Parties must not only restrict
the right for the enumerated purposes, but must also take concrete steps directed
towards the realization of the aim for which the right to freedom of expression
was limited.19 1 Likewise, the concept of democratic necessity implies that the
interference with the exercise of freedom of expression corresponds to a pressing
social need and is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 
92
2. The Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation
The role of the European Court is subsidiary to that of States Parties to
identify a given threat and consequently restrict a right. This implies that the
national authorities, "[b]y reason of their direct and continuous contact with the
pressing needs of the moment, .... ,93 enjoy certain discretion in determining a
need for the restriction of a convention right. This discretion is termed as
"margin of appreciation," a doctrine that was established by the Strasbourg
organs, the application of which will differ depending on the category of speech
and protected interests.194 The doctrine of margin of appreciation, however, does
187. As noted earlier, Strasbourg Organs accept the legitimacy of the Holocaust denial laws.
Indeed, although there have been a number of challenges to Holocaust denial laws before the
European Court, they were rejected and not granted protection under Article 10 of the Convention.
See Case of Lehideux and Isomi v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. 55/1997/839/1045 art. I(B) (1998).
188. Mahoney & Early, supra note 4, at 113.
189. Sunday Times, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245, 49.
190. Id.
191. See GOMIEN, supra note 180, at 115.
192. Olsson v. Sweden, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 134, 67-68 (1988).
193. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (ser. A) 1 207 (1978).
194. For a comprehensive analysis of the doctrine see HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN
OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 1
(Martinus Nijhoff Pub. 1996). For the evolution and specific applications of the doctrine see
YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR I (Intersentia 2002); Onder Bakircioglu,
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not grant the national authorities an uncontrolled power, i.e., despite the
subsidiary role of the Court, margin of appreciation goes hand in hand with
European supervision. 195 The European Court, in other words, "is responsible
for ensuring the observance of those States' engagements, is empowered to give
the final ruling on whether a 'restriction' . . . " is compatible with the rights
guaranteed by the Convention. 196 Such an evaluation unquestionably considers
whether national authorities exercised their discretion in good faith and in
accordance with the letter and spirit of the Convention.'
9 7
It must be stressed that international supervision over national discretion
provides a valuable tool in preventing undue suppression of free speech. At the
European level, the doctrine of margin of appreciation, although not free from
problems, 198 serves an important purpose. On the one hand, the system is based
on the assumption that the needs of a given country can best be known by its
national authorities, on the other, it takes into account the potential dangers of an
unlimited domestic margin.
3. Limitations Based on Hate Speech
As noted earlier, the European Convention does not specifically prohibit
hate speech. The victims of hate speech cannot invoke the non-discrimination
clause prescribed in Article 14 of the Convention either; for unlike the ICCPR,
the non-discrimination clause under the European Convention is not free
standing. In other words, Article 14 prohibits discrimination in connection with
the enjoyment of other substantive rights set forth in the Convention. Although
Protocol 12 to the Convention is not parasitic and does not require claims of
discrimination attached to other substantive rights, it does not prohibit
discrimination by private parties. Therefore, this clause does not provide
sufficient means to challenge hate speech effectively.
The European Commission in a number of decisions invoked Article 17 and
Article 14 of the Convention to allow governments to prohibit and prosecute
people who exercise their right to freedom of expression or association with the
aim of destroying other rights. For instance, in Glimmerveen & Hagenbeek,199
the distribution of racist leaflets was considered to be beyond the final limit of
the protected expression, and hence the application was declared manifestly ill-
The Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in Freedom of Expression and Public
Morality Cases, 8 GERMAN L.J. 711 (2007).
195. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 737, 49 (1976).
196. Id. (footnote omitted); see also OVEY & WHITE, supra note 182, at 285-86.
197. Bakircioglu, supra note 194, at 718.
198. For the complications of the doctrine see id.; see also Yves Winisdoerffer, Margin of
Appreciation and Article ] of Protocol No.], 19 HUM. RTS. J. 18, 20 (1998).
199. 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 260 (1979).
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founded. Similarly, in H., W., P. and K.20 it was held that "National Socialism
is a totalitarian doctrine incompatible with democracy and human rights and that
its adherents undoubtedly pursue aims of the kind referred to in Article 1
The case of Garaudy202 is also quite illustrative of the strict approach of the
European Court towards the revisionist theories that deny the existence of crimes
against humanity. In that case, the applicant, who was the writer of the book,
The Founding Myths of Modern Israel, was convicted of disputing the existence
of crimes against humanity, racial defamation of a group of people, the Jewish
community, and inciting racial hatred. The applicant, inter alia, complained
under Article 10 of the European Convention that his right to freedom of
expression was violated. The Court, however, decided that the case was
inadmissible, for it fell into the category of prohibited aims under Article 17 of
the Convention. The Court noted that:
[D]enying the reality of clearly established historical facts, such as the
Holocaust ... does not constitute historical research akin to a quest for the
truth.... [T]he real purpose [is] to rehabilitate the National-Socialist regime
and, as a consequence, accuse the victims themselves of falsifying history.
Denying crimes against humanity is therefore one of the most serious forms of
racial defamation of Jews and of incitement to hatred of them. The denial or
rewriting of this type of historical fact undermines the values on which the
fight against racism and anti-Semitism are based and constitutes a serious
threat to public order. Such acts are incompatible with democracy and human
rights because they infringe the rights of others.
203
This judgment clearly reflects the underlying philosophy of the European
system in which free speech is not regarded as an end in itself, but one of the
important tools for the establishment of democratic societies. Perhaps the most
significant case highlighting such philosophy is Jersild v. Denmark,204 where the
conviction of a journalist, for aiding and abetting the dissemination of racist
views in a televised interview that was conducted with the members of an
extreme right-wing group called the Greenjackets, was considered to violate the
right to freedom of expression. In the interview the members of the racist group
made abusive and derogatory remarks about immigrants and ethnic groups.
While the interview was edited down to a few minutes, some of these racist
remarks were retained and broadcasted. The programme was introduced by
addressing a discussion about racism in the country and the motives behind such
200. B.H., M.W., H.P. and G.K. v. Austria, App. No. 12774/87, Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
62 (1989).
201. Id. at 216 (parenthetical omitted).
202. Garaudy v. France, App. No. 65831/01 (2003).
203. Id. at 23.
204. Jersild v. Denmark, App. No. 15890/89 (1994).
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a reality. Consequently, three members of the group were convicted of making
racist statements that violated the Danish Penal Code and the journalist and
editor of the programme were convicted for complicity in making the statements
public.
The Court firstly determined that the interference with the applicant's
freedom of expression had the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and
reputations of others. Furthermore, it held among others: (a) that although it was
not within its mandate to determine the nature of Denmark's responsibilities
under Article 4 of CERD to punish the dissemination of racist views, Article 10
did not run counter to Denmark's obligations under CERD; (b) that it was not for
the courts to determine what technique of reporting should be adopted by
journalists and that the programme in fact did not intend to disseminate racist
views, rather it sought to address the problem of racism which was of great
public concern at the time; (c) that the programme was a part of a serious news
programme aimed at a well-educated audience; (d) that the press is vital for the
proper functioning of democratic societies, which should be allowed to play its
role as a "public watchdog;" (f) that although the crude statements did not enjoy
the protection of Article 10, the conviction of the journalist was not justified,
since it was not his intention to disseminate racist views, but to inform the public
about a matter of great importance; (g) that the national authorities had not
convincingly established that the interference with the applicant's right to
freedom of expression was necessary in a democratic society, nor were the
means employed proportionate to the aim pursued; there had thus been a
violation of Article 10.205
The decision is important for several reasons. First, it provides a general
guideline, although it is not within the Court's mandate and therefore not
authoritative, as to how to interpret Article 4 of CERD. The Court is very clear
in not granting protection for the members of the Greenjackets group for their
degrading racist remarks with no value in content; on the other hand, the Court
emphasizes the importance of free media in democratic societies and grants wide
protection for its contribution to discussion on matters of public concern. In
doing this, the Court takes account of the surrounding circumstances as a whole,
including the nature of the programme and its audience, the intention of the
journalists and the role of the media in democratic societies. In other words, the
Court, rather than applying a formalistic approach, takes a contextual approach
in handling the matter, which is of crucial importance in striking a proper
balance between the competing interests.
Following the said decision, the Danish Parliament amended the law
concerning media liability, which brought the national legislation in line with the
205. Id. 30-36.
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requirements of the European Convention.2 06 This example highlights the role
and strength of supranational authorities in affecting the legislation of States
Parties as well as in fighting undue encroachments on the right to freedom of
expression.
The recent case of Norwood v. UK 207 is another important case, where a
member of the British National Party was convicted of an offence under the
Public Order Act 1986 for displaying a poster that contained a photograph of the
Twin Towers in flames, a crescent and star in a prohibition sign. The poster
carried the words "Islam out of Britain - Protect the British People." 20 8 The
European Court observed that making hostile comments about somebody's race
or ethnicity is tantamount to criticising a person for what he or she is, which
might also hold true as regards to one's religion. The Court therefore declared
that the words and images contained in the poster amounted to a public attack on
the entire Muslim population in the United Kingdom:
Such a general, vehement attack against a religious group, linking the group
as a whole with a grave act of terrorism, is incompatible with the values
proclaimed and guaranteed by the Convention, notably tolerance, social peace
and non-discrimination. The applicant's display of the poster in his window
constituted an act within the meaning of Article 17, which did not, therefore,
enjoy the protection of Articles 10 or 14.209
The Court's decision prudently responds to the challenges and sweeping
prejudices 21 that emerged in post-September 11 era where civil liberties of
minority groups are seriously threatened.211 In sum, the European Court has so
far taken a robust approach against all forms of expression that spread, promote,
206. See Eur. Comm'n against Racism and Intolerance [ECRI], Second Report on Denmark,
Strasbourg: Council of Eur. (Apr. 3, 2001).
207. Norwood v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23131/03 (2004).
208. Id. at 2.
209. Id. at 4 (citation ommitted).
210. See Mathew Hickley, Most Britons Feel Threatened by Islam, MAIL ONLINE, Aug. 25, 2006,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-402234/Most-Britons-feel-threatened-Islam.html; Lord
John Stevens, If You're a Muslim It's Your Problem, NEWS OF THE WORLD, AUG. 13, 2006,
http://notwats.blogspot.com/2006/08/if-youre-muslim-its-your-problem.html; see also Alison
Little, Europe Tells Britain: Don't Say 'Muslims,' DAILY EXPRESS, July 5, 2007,
http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/12236.
211. See Van Bergen & Valentine, supra note 30, at 451-52; see also Cassel, supra note 128, at
11; Ivan Hare, Crosses, Crescents and Sacred Cows: Criminalising Incitement to Religious
Hatred, P.L. 2006, 521 (2006).
2008]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
encourage or justify hatred based on intolerance (including religious intolerance),
discrimination or racism.
212
VI. THE POTENTIAL DANGERS OF LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION
Every right becomes controversial when it clashes with other interests or
threatens, in one way or another, other important individual or communal
interests. 213  The practical question here is not related to the necessity of
restrictions, but to the nature of the restriction involved. In other words, the
questions that are to be answered include to what extent a right should be
restricted in a concrete case, what right should prevail over the other, and
whether arbitrariness can be prevented.
There should be no doubt that exerting too much control over free speech
might render the right meaningless, which could eventually lead to thought-
control. In a democratic society the potential conflict between rights and
freedoms should be resolved in a reasonable manner. Nevertheless, there is no
ready-made or pre-defined solution to the problem at hand; in other words the
exact boundaries of a limitation cannot be conclusively set beforehand. Even
though judicial bodies can set certain tests, such as clear and present danger, 2 14
or "'imminent lawless action," 215 these criteria are generally applied according
to the political atmosphere of a given historical period. This is because in the
domain of free speech, particularly when the vital interests of states are at stake,
there hardly exists a strict coherence and consistency in case-law; thus one can
readily observe that in politically sensitive climates courts tend to "demonstrate
the least independence and greatest deference to the claims of government when
national security is invoked."
' 216
For instance, in Mpaka-Nsusu v. Zaire,2 17 the Human Rights Committee
found that the applicant was arbitrarily arrested and held for nearly one and a
half year without trial, banished to his village of origin for an indefinite period
212. This was reaffirmed in a recent case, where it was noted that expressions that fall into the
domain of hate speech discourse do not enjoy the protection of Article 10 of the Convention. See
Erdogan v. Turkey, App. No. 59405/00, 56-57 (July 6, 2006).
213. Ronald Dworkin, We Do Not Have a Right to Liberty, in READINGS IN SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 184 (2d ed., Robert M. Stewart ed., Oxford U. Press 1996).
214. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
215. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
216. Sandra Coliver, Commentary to: The Johannesburg Principles on National Security,
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 12, 14 (1998).
217. Hum. Rts. Comm., Comm'n No. 132/1982, Mpaka-Nsusu v. Zaire, at 142, U.N. Doc. Supp.
No. 40 (A/41/40) (Sept. 5, 1986).
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and had suffered merely for his political opinions. Similarly, in Monja Jaona
v. Madagascar,2 19 the applicant, who was a candidate in the presidential
elections against the incumbent president, during his campaign condemned the
allegedly corrupt policies of the government, after which he was arrested and
held for an unlimited period of time without any reasons being given for his
arrest. The Committee again observed that the applicant merely "sufferedS- ,,220
persecution on account of his political opinions.
A. Borderline Cases
Admittedly, "it is sometimes extremely difficult to draw a clear line
. ,,221
between criticism and advocacy, or incitement, against democracy. For
example, in the case of Castells v. Spain222 where an elected representative of an
opposition party, which was generally considered to be the political branch of
ETA, the Basque terrorist organization, published an article which clearly
suggested that special police units were murdering people in the Basque
territories with impunity. The European Court noted that while freedom of
expression was not an absolute right in nature, it is of particular importance for
an elected representative of the people as "[h]e represents his electorate, draws
223
attention to their preoccupations and defends their interests." The Court stated
that:
The limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the Government
than in relation to a private citizen, or even a politician. In a democratic
system the actions or omissions of the Government must be subject to the
close scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial authorities but also of the
press and public opinion. Furthermore, the dominant position which the
Government occupies makes it necessary for it to display restraint in resorting
to criminal proceedings, particularly where other means are available for
replying to the unjustified attacks and criticisms of its adversaries or the
media.224
218. Id. I 10.
219. Hum. Rts. Comm., Comm'n No. 132/1982, Monja Jaona v. Madagascar, 14, U.N. Doc.
Supp. No. 40 (A/40/40) (Apr. 1, 1985).
220. Id.
221. See Jochen Abr. Frowein, Incitement against Democracy as a Limitation of Freedom of
Speech, in FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY 33, 36 (David Kretzmer et
al. eds., Kluer Law Int'l. 2000).
222. Castells v. Spain, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 445 (ser. A) (Apr. 23, 1992).
223. Id. 42.
224. Id. 46.
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Similarly, Zana v. Turkey225 can also be classified as a borderline case, where the
applicant, the former mayor of Diyarbakir and a principal Kurdish political
leader, was convicted on the basis of a statement published in a newspaper in
which he stated that: "I support the PKK national liberation movement; on the
other hand, I am not in favour of massacres. Anyone can make mistakes, and the
PKK kill women and children by mistake ... ."226
The Court reasoned that the statement could not be looked at in isolation
and therefore it was necessary to take into account the context in which the
statement was made. It observed that "the interview coincided with murderous
attacks carried out by the PKK on civilians in south-east Turkey, where there
was extreme tension at the material time, . . . " so the interview "had to be
regarded as likely to exacerbate an already explosive situation in that region."
227
Consequently, the Court, among other things, held that the penalty imposed on
the applicant could reasonably be regarded as answering a pressing social need
and that the reasons adduced by the national authorities are relevant and
sufficient; 228 thus there had been no violation of the right to freedom of
expression.
B. Proposed Solutions: The Necessity to Depend on the State and Civil Society
Freedom of speech is undoubtedly a great achievement of democratic
revolutions; therefore it should never be taken for granted, 229 that is, any
restriction on free speech should follow certain legal principles and
safeguards. 23  Broad and vague limitations not only remove the ability of the
individual to decide whether a particular course of action falls within the ambit
of criminal responsibility, but it may also discourage him to carry out legally
225. Zana v. Turkey, App. No. 00018954/91, Eur. Ct. H.R. 69/1996/688/880 (Nov. 25, 1997).
226. Id. 12.
227. Id. 99 59-60.
228. Id. 9958-62.
229. Chaim Herzog, Introductory Remarks: Public Interest and Free Speech, in FREE SPEECH
AND NATIONAL SECURITY 3, 3 (Shimon Shetreet ed., 1990).
230. As the European Court held in Malone:
[I]t would be contrary to the rule of law for the legal discretion granted to the
executive to be expressed in terms of an unfettered power. Consequently, the
law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent
authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard
to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate
protection against arbitrary interference.
Malone v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 68 (Aug.
2, 1984).
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permitted activities. This might eventually lead to stagnation in society where
citizens can no longer avail of the right to criticise their own governments.
231
Abuse of power has always been a danger within the exercise of state
power, yet in the absence of checks and balances over free speech, other crucial
and competing values might be overshadowed or even destroyed. The state,
therefore, should neither be merely an indifferent observer nor too intrusive over
individual liberties, but should be an effective body to protect the vulnerable.
Such a role can be maintained through constant checks and balances carried out
by national/international judiciaries along with civil society. This argument is
also consistent with the theoretical role of the state, which is, by placing itself
above the conflicting parties, to secure security and peace in society. 232 This
role is crucial, particularly with respect to hate speech that disrupts the targeted
group's lives and violates their right to security and peaceful co-existence, which
in turn might lead them to take the law into their own hands to implement their
own justice against hate-mongers. 233
Throughout history violence towards a certain group has usually predicated
upon prior ideological justifications, be it in the form of hate speech or public
incitement. Therefore, a responsible government that claims to be democratic
should act vigilantly against the potential dangers of unleashed speech. This
position not only defends the necessity to uphold the right to freedom of
expression, but it further stresses the preservation of peaceful unity in society by
balancing the conflicting interests properly.
231. Kremnitzer & Ghanayim, supra note 6, at 154.
232. Marxist theory puts forward a challenging argument with respect to the emergence and the
role of the state:
The state ... is by no means a power forced on society from outside: neither is
it the "realization of the ethical idea," "the image and the realization of reason,"
as Hegel maintains. It is simply a product of society at a certain stage of
evolution. It is the confession that this society has become hopelessly divided
against itself, has entangled itself in irreconcilable contradictions which it is
powerless to banish. In order that these contradictions, these classes with
conflicting economic interests, may not annihilate themselves and society in a
useless struggle, a power becomes necessary that stands apparently above
society and has the function of keeping down the conflicts and maintaining
"order." And this power, the outgrowth of society, but assuming supremacy
over it and becoming more and more divorced from it, is the state.
See FREDERICK ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE STATE
206 (Ernest Untermann trans., 1902). Cf JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT 4-7 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1960); THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN: OR, THE MATTER, FORME & POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH, ECCLESIASTICALL
AND CIVILL 81, 115 (A. R. Waller ed., Cambridge U. Press 1904).
233. See Kremnitzer & Ghanayim, supra note 6, at 164.
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C. The "Broken Window" Theory
It is established that most hate crimes are opportunistic, that is, not
everyone who bears animus against a segment of society or individual will say or
do something in confrontational situations. The circumstances of each case
determine the deed or speech; i.e., it depends on the quantity and/or identity of
the perpetrator(s) and the vulnerability of the victim in a given scenario. 234 It is
therefore arguable that the state should take positive measures to reduce the
opportunities for both hate speech and crimes from being committed.
The "broken window theory," which was formulated within the discipline
of criminology to create safer neighbourhoods, is quite relevant in this context.
Researchers studying urban decay and crime attempted to discover why the rate
of crime is noticeably lower in some neighbourhoods than in others, even though
the economic or demographic characteristics of the neighbourhoods were similar.
To this end, they conducted an experiment in the South Bronx, New York where
an expensive and undamaged car was parked and left unguarded for a long
period of time. It was later observed that the car remained fully intact, yet when
researchers broke a little window on the side, the car had been turned upside
down and utterly destroyed within a few hours.
235
Following further research the "broken window theory" was developed and
recognized to suggest that evidence of decay, such as broken windows,
accumulated trash, undeleted graffiti in the neighbourhood, encourages the
criminals to commit further acts of vandalism within the community. This
makes the inhabitants more vulnerable to such acts and therefore unwilling to
take necessary measures to maintain or restore order, which in turn increases the
level of crime considerably. The "broken window" theory implies that when the
maintenance of law and order is neglected, not only criminal opportunities
increase, but society becomes feeble and noticeably fearful and indifferent to the
deterioration.
236
From this perspective, the state apparatus should interfere with speech that
contains the seeds of crime or serious violations of the right to equality and non-
discrimination. Governments must not only change the environment where
racial hatred is rooted, but they must also aim to encourage respect for the human
• • • ,, ,,237
rights and dignity of those who are regarded as the "others. As much overall
234. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 18, at 21.
235. See J. Wilson and G. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighbourhood Safety, 249
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 29,32-33 (1982).
236. As one of the founders of this theory notes: "'Broken Windows' is a metaphor. It argues
that just as a broken window left untended is a sign that nobody cares and leads to more damage,
so disorder left untended also signifies that nobody cares and leads to fear of crime, more serious
crime and urban flight and decay." Julie Samia Mair & Michael Mair, Violence Prevention and
Control Through Environmental Modifications, 24 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 209, 214 (2003).
237. Gordon, supra note 31, at 17.
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responsibility that the government undertakes, it must be highlighted that civil
society also plays a crucial role in the prevention of hate speech and crime. A
society in which citizens act responsibly in order to preserve the standards that
enables them to live together in peace and harmony can be seen as a society
where the amount of hate speech and hate crimes are reduced dramatically.
VII. CONCLUSION
Hate-mongers do not promote liberty; rather they advocate the oppression
of weaker groups, which include homosexuals, national/racial minorities and
immigrants over whom they claim superiority. The content of hate speech is
thus not liberating; in contrast it is oppressive and alarming given that such
speech usually targets the weak that do not have proper access channels to voice
their grievances or seek remedies. Experience shows that these often powerless
segments of society resort to violence when they are severely deprived of the
means to challenge such verbal violence. Further, hate speech might also
produce its devastating effects within a very short period of time -as the
Yugoslavian and Rwandan experience illustrates- where there is no possibility
or time to counterbalance the speech which may imminently lead to hate crimes.
It is therefore too simplistic to claim that the best cure for hate speech is more
speech.
Admittedly, the restriction of hate speech does not extinguish its root causes
beneath the surface; none the less one of the main functions of the law to
regulate individual behaviour by attaching sanctions to untoward acts. 238 Law,
in this sense, shapes the boundaries of our liberties and limits by envisaging a
rule of human conduct that is deemed obligatory and binding upon all citizens. It
is thus an established and accepted set of human conduct to govern the
relationships between individuals with the promise of a suitable sanction for the
disobedient.239 Consider the following hypothetical case in which a man wants
to kill his wife, yet avoids doing so due to his fear of criminal punishment.
Perhaps on the subconscious level he harboured such a desire for many years,
but the apprehension of punishment deterred him from carrying it out. In here,
although the law did not cure his dreadful desire, it effectively prevented him
from committing the actus reus element of the offence. In this vein, law is
needed not to eliminate the underlying causes of hate speech, but to prevent its
destructive consequences.
Similarly, slavery was abolished only a century ago. Perhaps, this ban did
not extinguish the desire of some to reinstitute slavery; yet it, at least, legally
eradicated such an inhuman institution. The same holds true for child
238. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 320 (Max Knight trans., Univ. Ca. Press 1967).
239. See J. M. Coady, Morality and the Law, 1 UNIv. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 442,442-42 (1959).
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pornography, which is prohibited in most countries, including the United States.
It might well be argued that some people wish to watch child pornography
(which might be regarded as a form of expression), and its suppression will not
eradicate the inherent problem; in contrast its banishment might hinder us from
seeing what goes wrong in the society. However, a choice must be made
between the conflicting values. As Baer rightly observes:
[E]quality does not mean a formal distribution of equal weight to different
perspectives regardless of their content. In speech law, the right of equality
forces the law to differentiate between speech that targets powerless
individuals and speech that targets powerful social groups. Equality embodies
the right against disadvantage, against dominance, it is not a right based on
false "neutrality". Therefore, equality requires the law to intervene when
speech produces hierarchy. This stands in contrast to much liberal law, in
which there exists no test of potential justifications for unequal law.
240
Of course, it can well be argued that unless the conditions, which give rise
to inequality, racism or discrimination in all its forms, are not addressed at the
root, the problem would not be solved but be triggered as soon as the conditions
would permit.24 1 As noted earlier, this long but worthwhile process should no
doubt involve serious economic, social, cultural, educational and democratic
reforms as well as the promotion of responsible civil societies on the global
level.
Thus, the solution does not lie in allowing any opinion, regardless of its
intellectual value, in the "marketplace of ideas" where the powerful can easily
"sell" their ideas at the expense of the vulnerable; but it lies in a comprehensive
analysis of what causes inequality, unfair distribution of economic resources,
historical grievances or other circumstances that give rise to hate and injustice.
Hate speech or hate crimes are merely symptoms of a disease; thus legal
regulation or control cannot cure it; however, it can be of crucial help in
streamlining speech, and, to a certain extent, preventing discrimination or
manifestations of racism and hate crimes. Unfortunately, today's civilization has
240. Susanne Baer, Violence: Dilemmas of Democracy and Law, in FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMORACY 92 (David Kretzmer et al. eds., 2000).
241. As Sidney Hook points out:
I believe any people in the world, when roused to a fury of nationalistic
sentiment, and convinced that some individual or group is responsible for their
continued and extreme misfortune can be led to do or countenance the same
things the Germans did. I believe that if conditions in the U.S. were ever to
become as bad psychologically and economically as they were in Germany in
the 1920s and 1930s, systematic racial persecution might break out. It could
happen to the blacks, but it could happen to the Jews, or any targeted group.
DELGADO & STEFANIC, supra note 18, at 1.
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not yet created a cure for crime, disorder, hate, wars, inequality or other major
problems. We must therefore rely on the law as a tool to regulate human
conduct, including speech, which might at times be a deadly weapon.

